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Our Equity: Federalism and Chancery
JEFFREY STEVEN GORDON*
Federal courts sitting in diversity cannot agree on
whether state or federal law governs the award of a preliminary injunction. The conditions for the exercise of a federal
diversity court’s extraordinary remedial power are anybody’s guess. The immediate cause of the confusion is Justice Frankfurter’s cryptic opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, which aggressively enforced Erie and, at the same
time, preserved the so-called “equitable remedial rights”
doctrine. There are, however, much broader and deeper
causes that explain why the equitable remedial rights doctrine is almost incomprehensible today.
This Article argues that the early history of equity in the
federal courts is a distinctive and untold story about equity’s
interaction with judicial federalism. Conventionally, this is
a tale of two equities: homogeneous equity, where federal
courts apply uniform nonstate equity, and heterogeneous equity, where federal courts apply state equity. This Article
demonstrates that homogeneous federal equity commenced
in 1809, about a decade earlier than previously thought, and
that there is a deep and unappreciated tension at the center
of heterogeneous federal equity.
The primary contribution of this Article is to recover a
third federal equitable tradition, a middle ground between
the extremes of homogeneity and heterogeneity. This third
conception of federal equity—the facilitative conception—is
*
Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School. Sincerest thanks to Sam Bray,
John Langbein, Doug Laycock, Mark Leeming, Tom Merrill, Henry Monaghan,
Ron Sackville, my friends and colleagues participating in Columbia’s Associates
and Fellows Workshop, and the editors and staff of the University of Miami Law
Review. All errors are mine.
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revealed by a close reading of federal equity cases before
1809, a period to which equity scholars have paid scant attention. The facilitative conception originated in the earliest
years of the Republic, was sensitive to the legitimate interests and activities of the states, and contributed to the construction of the early United States. Using a key supplied by
the facilitative conception of federal equity, this Article proposes a system of shifting presumptions to systematize and
structure the equitable remedial rights doctrine.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Here is a simple question: should federal courts sitting in diversity apply state or federal law when deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction?1 For decades, federal courts have split on this
straightforward question about the application of Erie.2 Some courts
apply federal law; others apply state law; and still others adopt a
mixed approach.3 Scholars have tackled the problem head-on.4 But

1

The same question arises when federal courts exercise supplemental jurisdiction. In general, the question arises when a federal court enforces a state-created right. My central concern is not about federal courts applying equity in public
law to enforce federal constitutional or statutory imperatives against the states.
2
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See David Crump, The
Twilight Zone of the Erie Doctrine: Is There Really a Different Choice of Equitable Remedies in the “Court a Block Away”?, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1233, 1234–35
(1991); John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 190–91,
228 (1999).
3
See infra Part V.A.
4
See generally Crump, supra note 2, at 1233–35; Cross, supra note 2, at
190–91, 228.
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a federal court in California noted the conflict almost fifty years
ago,5 and today nothing has changed.
Before Erie was decided in 1938, our simple question was
among the easiest to answer. Because a preliminary injunction is an
equitable remedy, federal law governed.6 At the time—shockingly,
to our Erie-habituated instincts—federal courts across the nation enforced a uniform set of equitable doctrines and remedies, regulated
under the Federal Equity Rules.7 Kristin Collins has shed some
much-needed light on the equity side of the federal courts in the
nineteenth century, concluding that “federal courts generally applied
a uniform body of nonstate, judge-made equity principles.”8 Our
question became much more difficult after Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York reoriented federal equity to the states in 1945.9 Applying Erie,
Justice Frankfurter overturned the homogeneous (uniform) conception of federal equity in favor of a heterogeneous (state-by-state)
one.10 Federal diversity courts, even when sitting in equity, were to
consider themselves “only another court of the State”11—although
plainly this was an exaggeration.12 Frankfurter, however, included a
vague caveat: “[t]his does not mean . . . that a federal court may not
afford an equitable remedy not available in a State court.”13 It is the
indeterminate scope of this caveat, known as the “equitable remedial
rights” doctrine, that makes our simple question hard to answer.14
5

Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp.
923, 931 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (“The courts are in conflict . . . as to whether state
or federal law governs the issuance of an injunction.”).
6
See e.g., Breeden v. Lee, 4 F. Cas. 50, 51–52 (CC.E.D. Va. 1877) (No.
1,828); Taylor v. Clark, 89 F. 7, 7–8 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1898); Davidson v. Calkins,
92 F. 230, 232–36, (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1899).
7
See, e.g., Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1868).
8
Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 254 (2010)
[hereinafter Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation].
9
Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945).
10
See id. at 109–12.
11
Id. at 108.
12
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
13
Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 105.
14
See id. See generally Note, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine: Past
and Present, 67 HARV. L. REV. 836, 836 (1954) [hereinafter Past and Present];
Comment, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine, 55 YALE L.J. 401, 414–15
(1946) [hereinafter Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine].
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Our simple question is made even harder because it is only one
instance of a more general problem: should federal courts sitting in
diversity apply state or federal law when deciding whether to administer equitable relief? The answer matters because equitable
remedies are powerful; indeed, “[t]he preliminary injunction may be
the most striking remedy wielded by contemporary courts.”15 We
need a sure guide for understanding what law governs equitable relief when federal courts enforce state-created rights. This Article argues that neither the homogeneous nor heterogeneous conception of
federal equity is up to the task. But there is another equitable tradition, a middle ground between the extremes of homogeneity and heterogeneity. This third conception of federal equity—which I’ll call
the facilitative conception—provides a key for deciding whether to
apply state or federal law when equitable relief is requested in a diversity case. Drawing on equity’s classic distinction between the exclusive jurisdiction and the jurisdiction in aid of legal rights, the facilitative conception counsels that federal law presumptively governs only that equitable relief which merely facilitates or aids a final
merits decision.16 The presumption is rebutted if the relief is functionally equivalent to a final decision. On this view, federal law presumptively governs preliminary injunctions because they merely
seek to minimize the risk of irreparable injury pending litigation on
the merits.17
The facilitative conception finds its origins in the federal courts
at the turn of the nineteenth century.18 In the early years of the Republic, federal courts used equity to facilitate the commonsense implementation of the first Judiciary Act,19 and to contribute to the
construction of the early United States, in three distinct ways. First,
equity ensured that aggrieved states could enforce in federal court
legal claims deriving from their own statutes. Exercising original
jurisdiction in 1792, the Supreme Court enjoined a circuit court’s
15
John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 525, 525 (1978).
16
See J.D. HEYDON ET AL., MEAGHER, GUMMOW AND LEHANE’S EQUITY:
DOCTRINES & REMEDIES 11–12 (5th ed. 2015).
17
Leubsdorf, supra note 15, at 540–41 (“[T]he preliminary injunction standard should aim to minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors
incident to a hasty decision.”).
18
See infra Part IV.
19
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
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execution of a judgment at law because a state had no opportunity
to enforce its statute.20 The injunction preserved the status quo while
the Supreme Court determined the merits at common law.21 Second,
the federal courts, worried about encroaching on state powers, deployed equity to limit federal jurisdiction. For example, a circuit
court dismissed a common law action where a plaintiff had fraudulently manufactured diversity jurisdiction.22 The fraud was revealed
after an equitable bill of discovery pierced the common law pleadings and revealed that the true plaintiff was nondiverse.23 Third,
early federal equity courts sedulously applied state statutes, including statutes of limitation.24 They adopted state court interpretations
of limitation statutes, even if they thought that the state courts had
got it wrong.25 A common theme of federal equity’s three interventions is concern and regard for the role and status of the states in the
early federalism.
These different historical conceptions of federal equity (facilitative, homogeneous, and heterogeneous) are not cleanly demarcated,
hard-and-fast categories. They are useful devices for describing federal equity’s function and historical progression. The facilitative and
homogeneous conceptions, for example, were manifestations of the
general common law articulated by Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson.26
Federal courts cited state, federal, and English cases to determine as
best they could correct equitable doctrine. The differences between
facilitative and homogeneous federal equity illustrate that we can be
more precise in describing exactly what federal equity courts were
doing under the Swift regime.
This Article shows that the early history of equity in the federal
courts is an untold story about equity’s interaction with American

20

Georgia v. Brailsford (Brailsford I), 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405 (1792) (opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 405–06 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
21
Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 405 (opinion of Johnson, J.); id. at 407
(opinion of Blair, J.); id. at 409 (opinion of Jay, C.J.); Georgia v. Brailsford
(Brailsford II), 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 419 n.* (1793).
22
Maxfield’s Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330, 331–36, 338, 16 F. Cas.
1195 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No. 9,321).
23
Id. at 330–33.
24
See, e.g., Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454, 456–58 (1806).
25
See, e.g., Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 415, 419–20 (1808).
26
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842).
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judicial federalism. The first contribution of this Article is an analysis of federal equity before 1809, a period to which equity scholars
have paid scant attention. During this time, federal judges sitting in
diversity applied federal equity in service of state interests, reflecting a delicate federalist/antifederalist compromise.27 But the analysis shows more than the federal courts administering a distinct vision
of equity in the first two decades of the Republic. It also demonstrates, drawing on Stephen Skowronek’s theory of state-building28
and recent work on equity and administration,29 that this vision contributed to the construction of the early American state. Unnoticed
until now, early federal equity—which ensured the determination of
state legal claims, guarded against the fraudulent expansion of federal jurisdiction, and deferred to state statutory interpretation30—facilitated the practical administration of the judiciary and reinforced
the early American state of “courts and parties.”31
The second contribution of this Article is to show that the Supreme Court, speaking via John Marshall, adopted a robust homogeneous equity almost ten years earlier than previously thought.32 It
is a settled faith that the Supreme Court first established homogeneous federal equity in 1818.33 But nearly a decade earlier, two cases—
Bodley v. Taylor and Taylor v. Brown, both decided in 1809—speak
the language of homogeneous federal equity, marking the transition
from the facilitative conception to the homogeneous one.34 Scholars
have overlooked the full import of these two cases. This Article analyzes Bodley and Brown, and contextualizes Chief Justice Marshall’s pronouncement that “[i]n all cases in which a court of equity

27

See infra Part IV.
See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE:
THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 7–8
(1982).
29
See generally EQUITY AND ADMINISTRATION (P. G. Turner ed., 2016).
30
See infra Part IV.
31
SKOWRONEK, supra note 28, at 23, 27–29.
32
See infra Part III.A.
33
See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222–23 (1818).
34
See Bodley v. Taylor, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 191, 222 (1809); Taylor v. Brown,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 234, 255 (1809).
28
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takes jurisdiction, it will exercise that jurisdiction upon its own principles.”35
Third, this Article shows that equity is in deep tension with
Erie.36 Scholars have highlighted the internal inconsistency of
Guaranty Trust.37 On the one hand, Frankfurter’s opinion nominally
reaffirmed the equitable remedial rights doctrine, which preserves a
domain for independent federal equitable relief when enforcing
state-created rights.38 But on the other hand, Frankfurter aggressively enforced Erie in equity cases, saying that a federal court “cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made unavailable by the
State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the right as
given by the State.”39 In the result, Frankfurter resected over one
hundred years of homogeneous federal equity, leaving federal diversity courts with a chronically impoverished equitable remedial rights
doctrine. This “considerable surgical operation,”40 which reduced
federal equity in diversity cases to “the forms and mode of enforcing
the [state-created] right,”41 “marked a significant—even seismic—
change.”42
This Article argues that there is a tension between equity and
Erie running deeper still. After Guaranty Trust, a federal equity
court engages in a qualitatively different inquiry to its premerger
counterpart. Today, federal diversity courts do not ascertain upon
general reasoning and legal analogies the just rule furnished by the

35

Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 222. Bodley and Brown concerned title to land,
which Swift explicitly excepted. They are, in their result, an application of local
law. But large portions of the opinions are devoted to what Marshall called an
“inquiry of vast importance whether . . . a court of equity acts upon its known,
established and general principles, or is merely substituted for a court of law.” Id.
36
See infra Part III.B.
37
See, e.g., Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 280,
341–42 (equity is outcome-determinative vis-à-vis the common law, and “once
the general principle was transposed into the federal system, equity was by its
very nature outcome determinative vis-à-vis state law”).
38
See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945).
39
Id. at 108–09.
40
Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 339.
41
Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 108.
42
Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 338.
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principles of equity to govern the case. Instead, they are, within constitutional boundaries, “only another court of the State.”43 The question for a federal equity court sitting in diversity is not, “What is
equitable?”44 It is, instead, “What would a state court think is equitable?” The cabining of discretion, this Article argues, is antithetical
to equity. Applying Henry Smith’s account of equity as a secondorder system, a kind of safety valve, this Article shows that Guaranty Trust removed the federal equity court’s capacity to stage a
second-order intervention in diversity cases.45
The final contribution of this Article draws on the facilitative
conception of federal equity to both reinforce and normalize the equitable remedial rights doctrine that Guaranty Trust marginalized
but, in order to maintain a modicum of decisional independence in
the federal courts, nevertheless preserved. Federal courts have not
discarded the doctrine and their application of it is, to put it mildly,
uneven. This Article proposes a system of shifting presumptions for
the application of the equitable remedial rights doctrine.46 The initial
presumption follows the heterogeneity ordained by Guaranty Trust:
state law governs when equitable relief is requested on a state-created right.47 But that presumption can be rebutted in limited circumstances by showing that the requested equitable relief is preliminary
or auxiliary to, or merely facilitates or aids the final determination
of, the merits. These genuine preliminary injunctions do not engage
Erie’s twin aims,48 and only arise when state law does not provide
for them.49 And that presumption, in turn, can be rebutted by show-

43

Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 108.
More accurately, “What is the correct application of equitable doctrine to
the circumstances of this case?”
45
See Henry E. Smith, Fusing the Equitable Function in Private Law, in
PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 173, 175–76 (Kit Barker et al., eds., 2017).
46
See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Presumptions, 67 N.Y.U.L. REV. 907, 907 (1992).
47
See Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 108–09.
48
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965).
49
See FED. R. CIV. P. 64(a) (making available “every remedy . . . that, under
the law of the state where the court is located, provides for seizing a person or
property to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment”); see also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 330–31
(1999) (suggesting that Rule 64 governs injunctions restraining defendants from
dealing with assets pending resolution of litigation).
44
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ing that the requested equitable relief, although nominally facilitative, is functionally equivalent to a conclusive determination of the
litigation.
Facilitative federal equity thus supplies a key, a structural guide,
for answering our simple but difficult question. Preliminary injunctions are typically equitable, but are issued to minimize the risk of
irreparable injury to facilitate a final decision on the merits. In general, then, federal law should govern unless the preliminary injunction effectively decides the merits of the case. It is hoped that the set
of shifting presumptions provides real guidance to the federal courts
in resolving the doctrinal confusion over preliminary injunctions.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II briefly reviews the
nature of equity and its history leading up to the Founding. It sets
out equity’s classical exclusive and facilitative jurisdictions, and recounts the challenges to, and responses of, equity in England and the
American colonies. Part III analyzes the two prevailing conceptions
of federal equity, arguing that the homogeneous conception began
in 1809, about a decade earlier than previously thought, and that
there is a deep conceptual tension between equity and Erie, which
Guaranty Trust papered over. Part IV demonstrates that before 1809
the federal courts administered a distinct facilitative conception of
federal equity. It describes three instances in which the federal
courts, concerned about their place in the new nation, took advantage of equity’s flexibility to cabin their power and accommodate state interests. This Part also argues that the facilitative conception of federal equity contributed in small part to the construction of
the nascent American state. Part V incorporates the facilitative conception of federal equity into a system of shifting presumptions to
structure a federal court’s analysis under the equitable remedial
rights doctrine.
II.
EQUITY: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS
In the beginning, there was law and there was equity. Equity
provided doctrines and remedies to supplement and mollify the rigor
of the common law.50 By the mid-eighteenth century, equity had

50

HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 5.
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long shed its reputation for unbounded, discretionary decision-making.51 Equity’s association with the royal prerogative, however, was
harder to cast off—especially because chancery sat without a jury.52
Nevertheless, courts of chancery existed, at one time or another, in
most of the American colonies.53 Some colonies, such as South Carolina, embraced equity wholeheartedly in the eighteenth century.54
In others, like New York, the growth of equity jurisprudence was
uneven, partly due to intense political hostility.55 But the founding
generation was familiar with the law/equity divide, and Article III
extended the judicial power to all cases “in law and equity.”56
This Part briefly highlights that one of equity’s classic and important functions is to aid and assist the vindication of rights at common law. This is known as equity’s auxiliary or facilitative jurisdiction.57 It is this jurisdiction, transposed to the new federalism, that
the federal courts deployed in the early years of the Republic to contribute to the construction of the nascent United States.

Equity became “a highly articulated system . . . consist[ing] of a series of
distinct remedial devices” and “a set of conditions that determine whether equitable relief is appropriate.” Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings,
128 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1669–70 (2015). One of equity’s central features is the
development of “a set of principles or guidelines to structure the exercise of” great
“discretion so as to make it socially useful.” Id. at 1669.
52
Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies
over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 260 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 54–55 (2d ed. 1985).
53
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54.
54
See James Nelson Frierson, Legal Introduction, in 6 RECORDS OF THE
COURT OF CHANCERY OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1671-1779, at 20, 53–54 (Anne King
Gregorie ed., 1950); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54.
55
Joseph H. Smith & Leo Hershkowitz, Courts of Equity in the Province of
New York: The Cosby Controversy, 1732–1736, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 6–8, 40
(1972); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54–55.
56
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
57
HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 11–12; see also Baker v. Biddle, 2 F.
Cas. 439, 446 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 764).
51
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A.
The Nature of Equity
The standard definition of “equity” is not analytically satisfying
but proudly question-begging:58 “the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered
by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the
two countries.”59 Entirely separate from the common law courts, the
Court of Chancery exercised equity jurisdiction in England until
1873, when the Chancery Division was created within the High
Court of Justice.60 Chancery recognized forms of equitable property
(trusts, mortgages, and priorities of estates and interests), enforced
torts by injunction, enforced contracts by specific performance and
injunction, afforded relief against the rigidity of the common law
(fraud, undue influence, accident, and mistake), and provided procedural convenience (account, interrogatories, and discovery).61
Modern perspectives of equity center on Maitland’s famous dictum that equity is a “gloss” on the common law.62 The common law
58
F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW:
TWO COURSES OF LECTURES 1 (A.H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds., 1984)
(“What is Equity? . . . Equity is a certain portion of our existing substantive law,
and yet in order that we may describe this portion and mark it off from other
portions we have to make reference to courts that are no longer in existence.”).
See generally WILLIAM W. BILLSON, EQUITY IN ITS RELATIONS TO COMMON
LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 3–5 (1917).
59
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.
308, 318 (1999) (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568
(1939)).
60
See generally D. M. KERLY, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE EQUITABLE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 1 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1986)
(1890); Supreme Court Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (Eng.).
61
See 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 252, 404–06
(1903); HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 10. See generally KERLY, supra note
60, at 191–92.
62
MAITLAND, supra note 58, at 18–19 (“We ought not to think of common
law and equity as of two rival systems. Equity was not a self-sufﬁcient system, at
every point it presupposed the existence of the common law. Common law was a
self-sufﬁcient system. I mean this: that if the legislature had passed a short act
saying ‘Equity is hereby abolished,’ we might still have got on fairly well; in some
respects our law would have been barbarous, unjust, absurd, but still the great
elementary rights, the right to immunity from violence, the right to one’s good
name, the rights of ownership and of possession would have been decently protected and contract would have been enforced. On the other hand had the legislature said, ‘Common law is hereby abolished,’ this decree if obeyed would have
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and equity are not “two rival systems”; equity is “a sort of appendix
added on to our code.”63 Equity supplements rather than substitutes
the common law.64 Equity assumes the operation of the common
law, and alters or aids that operation.65 In a modern functional characterization, equity is an ex post second-order intervention.66 The
common law supplies the first order rules, and equity acts on a party
who has opportunistically taken advantage of the harshness or absurdity of the common law.67
B.
Equity’s Exclusive and Facilitative Jurisdiction
Equity jurisdiction can be divided into exclusive jurisdiction on
the one hand, and facilitative or auxiliary jurisdiction on the other.68
The exclusive jurisdiction comprises areas where only equity can
provide relief.69 Enforcing a trust is the classic example. Traditionally, the common law did not recognize trusts, so relief for breach
of trust was available only in equity.70 Similarly, a vendor suing to
set aside a conveyance of land for undue influence had to proceed
in equity.71 In general, the exclusive jurisdiction included cases
where a plaintiff had sued on an equitable right, which the common
law refused to recognize.72
Equity’s facilitative or auxiliary jurisdiction was exercised in aid
of legal rights.73 The early American federal judiciary assured the
meant anarchy. At every point equity presupposed the existence of common
law.”).
63
MAITLAND, supra note 58, at 18–19. Accord 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 13 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1836) (“[Lord Bacon] said, Chancery
is ordained to supply the law, and not to subvert the law. Finch . . . says, that the
nature of Equity is to amplify, enlarge, and add to the letter of the law.”) (footnotes
omitted).
64
MAITLAND, supra note 58, at 18–19.
65
Id.
66
Smith, supra note 45, at 175–79, 181–83.
67
See generally id.
68
HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 11–12; see also David Yale, A Trichotomy of Equity, 6 J. LEGAL HISTORY 194, 194–96 (1985).
69
HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 11.
70
See generally id. at 7, 10–11.
71
See generally id.
72
See generally id.
73
See id. at 11–12.
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states, using two equitable devices, that the central government was
sensitive to their interests.74 The first is discovery. Before the midnineteenth century, discovery was available at common law only
with the assistance of equity.75 A defendant in a common law action
seeking documents from the plaintiff would have to file a bill of discovery in the court of chancery and, if successful, an injunction
would stay the legal proceedings until the information was disclosed.76 Any documents discovered, if proved and admissible,
could be evidence in the action at law.77 Second, an important component of the facilitative jurisdiction is the injunction to restrain the
violation of a common law right.78 This includes threatened violations, as well as continued or repeated violations of legal rights.79
Before 1852, chancery did not decide common law questions.80 So,
if a plaintiff apprehended an imminent violation of a common law
right, then equity could provide interim injunctive relief to facilitate
the common law determination of whether a right had been violated.81 The interim injunction was made perpetual if the common
law right was violated, and dissolved if not.82

74

See infra Part IV.
See Mark Leeming, Commentary, Seeking Documentary Evidence in
Transnational Litigation: Problems and Pitfalls, in INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL LAW, LITIGATION, AND ARBITRATION 90, 90 (K. E. Lindgren & N.
Perram eds., 2011) (discussing the bill of discovery procedure in the Court of
Chancery before 1852); McLean v. Burns Philp Tr. Co. [1985] 2 NSWLR 623,
644 (Austl.) (discussing the bill of discovery procedure in the Court of Chancery
before 1852).
76
See Leeming, supra note 75, at 90.
77
For a Founding-era innovation, see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 15, 1
Stat. 73, 82 (1789).
78
HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 708.
79
Id.
80
KERLY, supra note 60, at 285. A statute enacted in 1852 permitted the
Court of Chancery to determine common law rights and titles without requiring
litigants to file a separate action at law. 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, s. 62. In 1862, legislation hardened this power into a duty. Chancery Regulation Act of 1862, 25 &
26 Vict. c. 42, s. 1.
81
See, e.g., Harman v. Jones (1841) 41 Eng. Rep. 505, 505 (Ch).
82
See, e.g., id.; Bacon v. Jones (1839) 41 Eng. Rep. 167, 169 (Ch).
75
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Hostility to Equity: The Chancellor’s Foot and the King’s
Conscience
Two broad and persistent criticisms were leveled at chancery.
The first was directed at equity’s arbitrariness and subjectivity. In
England, Selden most effectively attacked equity, or conscience, as
nothing more than the idiosyncratic and personal moral judgment of
the chancellor.83 In a criticism published posthumously in 1689, he
famously lambasted equity as a “roguish thing,” because it was
measured against the chancellor’s conscience.84 We may as well,
said Selden, “make [th]e Standard for [th]e measure we[] call A
foot, . . . [th]e Chancellor[’]s foot . . . One Chancellor ha[]s a long
foot[,] another A short foot[,] a third an indifferent foot; ’tis [th]e
same thing in [th]e Chancellor’s Conscience.”85
The second criticism was that chancery, having originated in the
curia regis, was “closely associated with the royal prerogative.”86
Commencing in the late 1500s, English common lawyers, with some
popular support, launched a sustained assault on chancery.87 Sir Edward Coke frequently resisted attempts by James I to interfere with
the common law courts.88 Things came to a head in 1615, when
James overruled Coke and upheld Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s
view “[t]hat when a Judgment [at common law] is obtained by Oppression, Wrong and a hard Conscience, the Chancellor will frustrate and set it aside, not for any error or Defect in the Judgment, but
for the hard Conscience of the Party.”89
Both criticisms made their way to the New World; chancery’s
association with the monarch proved almost devastating in some
colonies.90 By the eighteenth century, “[h]ostility to chancery was
C.

83

TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Frederick Pollock ed. 1927).
Id.
85
Id. Accord Mike Macnair, Equity and Conscience, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 659, 680 (2007); M. Macnair, Arbitrary Chancellors and the Problem of
Predictability, in LAW & EQUITY: APPROACHES IN ROMAN LAW AND COMMON
LAW 79, 83 (E. Koops & W.J. Zwalve eds., 2014); DENNIS R. KLINCK,
CONSCIENCE, EQUITY AND THE COURT OF CHANCERY IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND 2 (2010).
86
Katz, supra note 52, at 260. Accord FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54–55.
87
Katz, supra note 52, at 260.
88
Id.
89
Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 487–89 (Ch).
90
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54–55; Katz, supra note 52, at 260, 265.
84
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widespread.”91 Massachusetts, for example, never established a separate court of chancery (although it selectively conferred some equity jurisdiction on common law courts).92 In New York, colonists
attacked the court of chancery as a juryless emanation of the Crown,
and the legislative assembly repeatedly protested various governors’
assertions of a unilateral power to create a separate equity court.93
This decades-long maelstrom curbed the development of equity.94
Pennsylvania, after several failed efforts, established its first and
only separate court of chancery in 1720, which operated with a significant docket.95 But after opposition intensified, it was disbanded
in 1736.96 In both New York and Pennsylvania, hostility to chancery
focused on equity’s potential for abuse rather than its ideology.97

91

FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54. Accord 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS
TO 1801, at 493 (1971) (“[T]he very word ‘chancery’ was identified with prerogative in the popular mind, and so unamendably un-American.”).
92
See Phyllis Maloney Johnson, No Adequate Remedy at Law: Equity in
Massachusetts 1692–1877 (Aug. 25, 2008), in YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY 3 (2012), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1001&context=student_legal_history_papers; FRIEDMAN, supra note 64,
at 54.
93
Smith & Hershkowitz, supra note 55, at 6–8, 40; see also FRIEDMAN, supra
note 55, at 54–55.
94
Smith & Hershkowitz, supra note 55, at 2; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note
55, at 54–55.
95
Sydney G. Fisher, The Administration of Equity Through Common Law
Forms, 1 L.Q. REV. 455, 456–57 (1885).
96
Id.
97
David Thomas Konig, Regionalism in Early American Law, in 1 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: EARLY AMERICA (1580–1815) 144,
175 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlin eds., 2008); Katz, supra note 52,
at 265 (“In the colonial period, at least, Americans objected to chancery courts
rather than to equity law.”); id. at 282 (“Equity law was accepted by all concerned—the dispute was over the constitution of the courts that dispensed equity.”); see also Calvin Woodard, Joseph Story and American Equity, 45 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 623, 641 (1988) (“For purely political reasons . . . equity started
off in this country with a black eye.”). But cf. GOEBEL, supra note 104, at 493
(“Equity was a word Americans had learned to live with as an ingredient of justice, but in states where there were no distinct chancery courts this forbearance
did not extend to more than a niggardly borrowing of the procedures by which
equity jurisprudence had been administered in England.”); id. at 500 (when dis-
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D.
Equity’s Response: Systematize and Support
English chancery developed two responses to the criticisms of
arbitrariness and prerogative tyranny. First, beginning in the early
sixteenth century, equity evolved from a personal morality and subjective conscience into a systematic body of principle.98 In 1676,
Nottingham, the father of systematic equity, proclaimed that “[w]ith
such a conscience as is only naturalis et interna [natural and internal, inward, personal], this Court has nothing to do; the conscience
by which I am to proceed is merely civilis et politica [civic and political, external, public], and tied to certain measures.”99 The transition was complete by the early nineteenth century under Eldon as
Lord Chancellor.100
Second, despite Ellesmere’s victory over Coke, chancery did not
then run roughshod over the common law.101 Bacon, Ellesmere’s
successor, published orders in 1618 to prevent abuse of injunctions
staying actions at law.102 In 1759, Hardwicke wrote that since the
Glorious Revolution, chancery judges “endeavoured with much
anxiety to preserve the boundaries of common law and equity from
being confounded; and have sent forth their injunctions to stop the
course of the common law with a cautious and sparing hand.”103 Importantly, in 1734, the Master of the Rolls, Sir Joseph Jekyll, noted
that the common law and equity had ceased their adversarial relationship.104 The “rules of law and equity,” said Jekyll, “are not to
oppose, but each, in its turn, to be subservient to the other.”105 Equity
in some cases “follows the law implicitly, in others, assists it, and
cussing the Congressional debates over the first Judiciary Act, “the inveterate belief in the virtues of jury trial had much to do with the apparent disinclination to
implement the jurisdiction in equity”).
98
JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 346–61 (2009);
HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 8–11.
99
Cook v. Fountain (1676) 36 Eng. Rep. 984, 990; Dennis R. Klinck, Lord
Nottingham and the Conscience of Equity, 67 J. HIST. IDEAS 123, 125 (2006).
100
LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 352–53; HEYDON ET AL., supra note
16, at 8–11.
101
See KERLY, supra note 60, at 99–100.
102
Id. at 116.
103
Id. at 166.
104
Cowper v. Cowper (1734) 24 Eng. Rep. 930, 942 (Ch).
105
Id.
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advances the remedy; in others again, it relieves against the abuse,
or allays the rigour of it; but in no case does it contradict or overturn the grounds or principles thereof.”106
In the American colonies, Joseph Story argued in his influential
treatise that equity “can scarcely be said to have been generally studied, or administered, as a system of enlightened and exact principles,
until about the close of the eighteenth century.”107 Story invoked
Hamilton’s observation about the “material diversity” of chancery
jurisdiction that existed in the several states in the late eighteenth
century.108 Story also invoked the lack of a mature system of law
reports.109 Plainly, there is much truth to Story’s claim—particularly
about the diversity of colonial institutional arrangements—and it
resonates today.110 But a more complete picture of colonial chancery
has emerged since Story wrote his treatise, and it cautions against
the absolute conclusion that colonial equity was a dead letter.
Despite the colonists’ hostility to the institution of the court of
chancery, equity nevertheless made halting progress to systematize
its jurisdiction and support the common law. Maryland, for example,
recognized equity as a separate system from the 1650s, when equity
suits were heard in the court of chancery.111 As early as the late sev-

106

Id.
STORY, supra note 63, at 63.
108
Id. at 62–63; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 502–03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
109
STORY, supra note 63, at 63.
110
Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler, in their important first edition, noted
that “in 1789 equity was either non-existent or undeveloped in the courts of many
of the states.” HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 578 (1st ed. 1953). See, e.g., John F. Preis, In
Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases, 22 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS J. 1, 23–24 (2013) (“[E]quity in the states was in disarray at the Founding.”); id. at 24 (claiming that there was no “coherent body of equity law at the
state level”); Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND.
L. REV. 997, 1011 (2015) (“[I]n 1789 the equity of the nascent United States was
relatively feeble and unsystematic.”); cf. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S
CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 103 (1990) (“An
American law of equity was beginning to emerge in some of the states, but other
states had no equity courts.”).
111
Bernard C. Steiner, Maryland’s First Courts, in 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1901, at 211, 227 (1902);
107
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enteenth century, procedure and remedies were consciously modeled on English chancery, and practitioners in England were consulted on points of dispute.112 Injunctions were granted, specific performance decreed, and jurisdiction assumed over trusts and matters
of fraud and mistake.113A surprising number of eighteenth-century
Maryland lawyers were educated at the Inns of Court.114 Similarly,
in eighteenth-century South Carolina, the doctrines and remedies of
equity were well understood and competently administered.115 In
Virginia, by the second quarter of the eighteenth century, the equity
cases brought to the General Court “were pleaded with tolerable
learning and skill.”116 At around the same time, “an extensive jurisdiction in chancery was . . . emerging” in Virginia’s county
courts.117 Indeed Richard Francis, who wrote the influential English

see also J. Hall Pleasants, The First Century of the Court of Chancery of Maryland, in 51 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF
CHANCERY OF MARYLAND 1669–1679, at xxxii, xxxiv (J. Hall Pleasants ed.,
1934).
112
Carroll T. Bond, Introduction to the Legal Procedure, in 51 ARCHIVES OF
MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF MARYLAND 1669–
1679, supra note 111 at xxii; see also Richard B. Morris, Book Review, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 632, 633 (1935) (reviewing 51 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF MARYLAND, 1669–1679 (J. Hall
Pleasants ed., 1934)).
113
Morris, supra note 112, at 633; see also Pleasants, supra note 111, at xxxii–
iii.
114
See Letter of Transmittal from Samuel K. Dennis et al., to the Maryland
Historical Society (Sept. 1, 1934), in 51 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF MARYLAND 1669–1679, supra note 111, at ix,
xii; Robert von Moschzisker, Book Review, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 1040, 1041 (1929)
(reviewing CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND, A
HISTORY (1928)).
115
See Frierson, supra note 54, at 53–54; see also Stanley M. Levy, Book
Review, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 165, 167 (1950) (reviewing 6 RECORDS OF THE COURT
OF CHANCERY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1671–1779 (Anne King Gregorie ed.,
1950)); R.L. Meriwether, Book Review, 17 J.S. HIST. 71, 71 (1951) (reviewing 6
AMERICAN LEGAL RECORDS: RECORDS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1671–1779 (Anne King Gregorie ed., 1950)).
116
Marvin K. Singleton, New Light on the Chancery Side of Virginia’s Evolution to Statehood, 2 J. AM. STUD. 149, 156 (1969).
117
William E. Nelson, Law and the Structure of Power in Colonial Virginia,
48 VAL. U.L. REV. 757, 817–18 (2014).
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text Maxims of Equity in 1729, immigrated to Virginia in 1738, and
practiced before the General Court in chancery.118
A subservient equity jurisdiction emerged and even grew in colonies openly hostile to chancery. In the first half of the eighteenth
century, the Pennsylvania common law courts were vested with equity jurisdiction, no doubt to remedy the absence of a separate court
of chancery.119 In 1768, for example, a plaintiff brought an action of
debt on a bond—a common law action.120 At common law, of
course, a defendant could not raise an equitable defense such as mistake or failure of consideration.121 To raise an equitable defense, the
defendant would file a bill in the court of chancery and, if successful,
chancery would enjoin the action at law.122 But in 1768, there was
no court of chancery in Pennsylvania.123 Rather than have the defendant go remediless, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania permitted equitable defenses in common law actions.124 The Court held
that “there being no Court of Chancery in this Province, there is a
118

See Jones v. Porter (Gen. Ct. Va. 1740), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, REPORTS
CASES DETERMINED IN THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA FROM 1730, TO
1740, AND FROM 1768, TO 1772, at 62, 66 n.* (Charlottesville, F. Carr., & Co.
1829). Baker called Maxims of Equity “the first published book on equity.” J. H.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 111 n.79 (4th ed. 2002).
See also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 339 n.82; W.H. Bryson, Francis,
Richard, OXFORD DICTIONARY NAT’L BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com/
view/article/47165.
119
This was the second time that this was done. See generally William Henry
Rawle, Equity in Pennsylvania, Lecture Before the Law Academy of Philadelphia
(Feb. 11, 1868), in EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA 1–12 (Philadelphia, Kay & Bros.
1868). In 1684, Pennsylvania’s Assembly passed a law providing that “every
court of justice should be a court of equity as well as of law.” Id. at 9. County
courts exercised jurisdiction at common law and in equity. Appeal from the
county courts was to the provincial court, which also tried any cases at law and in
equity over which the county courts could not exercise jurisdiction. See id. at 5–
8. The law establishing the county courts was disallowed in London in 1693. The
colonial assembly immediately re-established the courts, but they transacted very
little business. See generally Fisher, supra note 95, at 455–56; Spencer R. Liverant & Walter H. Hitchler, A History of Equity in Pennsylvania, 37 DICK. L. REV.
156, 159–60 (1933); WILLIAM H. LLOYD, THE EARLY COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA
168–69 (1910).
120
Swift v. Hawkins, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 17, 17, 1 Ald. 7 (Pa. 1768).
121
HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 34.
122
Id.
123
FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54.
124
Swift v. Hawkins, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 17.
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necessity, in order to prevent a failure of Justice, to let the Defendants . . . prove mistake or want of consideration.”125 By the second
half of the eighteenth century, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
routinely used the absence of a separate court of chancery to justify
the application of equitable doctrines.126 The Pennsylvania courts,
however, did not assume complete equity powers.127 A similar trend
occurred in Massachusetts, which emerged as a leader in trust law
despite the absence of a court of chancery.128
E.
At the Founding
With little argument at the Convention, Article III of the Constitution extended the federal judicial power to “law and equity.”129
Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred equity jurisdiction
on the federal courts,130 but section 16 prohibited suits in equity “in
any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at
125

Id. Chief Justice William Allen added that this practice—the interposition
of mistake and failure of consideration (equitable defenses) in an action of debt
sur obligation (a legal action)—was “known to be the constant practice of the
Courts of Justice in this Province for thirty nine Years past.” Id. This would put
the availability of equitable defenses in legal actions at 1729, when the separate
court of chancery was still operational.
126
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Fury, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 72, 72, 1 Ald. 20 (Pa. 1783) (a
beneficial owner of land could bring an action for ejectment, Justice Atlee observing that “[w]e have no Court of Equity here; and, therefore, unless the cestui que
trust could bring an ejectment in his own name, he would be without remedy, in
the case of an obstinate trustee”); James v. Browne, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 339, 339, 1
Ald. 98 (Pa. 1788) (noting that “we have no Court of Chancery to interpose an
equitable jurisdiction,” and “[t]he necessity of a liberal extension of the action of
Account render between joint partners, is apparent”); Wharton v. Morris, 1 U.S.
(1 Dall.) 125, 125–26, 1 Ald. 35 (Pa. 1785) (common law courts would administer
equity to remedy a penal bond or a breach of trust).
127
In Dorrow v. Kelly, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 142, 144, 1 Ald. 42 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Phila.
Cty. 1785), Edward Shippen, then President of the Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas, observed that “[t]he Courts of law in this state, have in some instances
adopted the chancery rules, to prevent the absolute failure of justice.” Id. But
“[b]eing a Court of law, we cannot take upon ourselves to act as a Court of chancery.” Id. Accordingly, the common pleas could not foreclose the equity of redemption, or impose terms upon a mortgagor applying to redeem. See id. at 144–
145.
128
See Johnson, supra note 92, at 3.
129
See GOEBEL, supra note 91, at 240; DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR
A NEW NATION 9 (1971); HOFFER, supra note 110, at 95.
130
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79 (1789).
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law.”131 Consonant with the colonial experience, much of the hostility to equity in the early United States centered on its mode of
implementation—lack of a jury—rather than its doctrine. For example, in the Senate debate on what became section 16, “more was said
in favor of Chancery than against.”132 It was the “inveterate belief
in the virtues of jury trial” that accounted for the “apparent disinclination to implement the jurisdiction in equity.”133 That said, both the
Federal Farmer and Brutus attacked equity itself. The Federal
Farmer thought that it was “a very dangerous thing to vest in the
same judge power to decide on the law, and also general powers in
equity,” because “if the law restrain him, he is only to step into his
shoes of equity, and give what judgment his reason or opinion may
dictate.”134 Brutus argued that the federal courts, being invested with
both equity jurisdiction and jurisdiction arising under the Constitution, “will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules,
but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason
and spirit of the constitution.”135
From 1792 to 1938, equity jurisdiction was exercised by the equity “side” of the federal courts.136 Procedure was pegged first to
“the course of the civil law” (from 1789 to 1792),137and then to “the
principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity . . . as
contradistinguished from courts of common law” (from 1792 to
1912).138 In 1792, the Supreme Court also acquired procedural rulemaking power for the equity side of the federal courts, which it exercised in an ad hoc manner in 1822 and 1842, and comprehensively
131
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82. (“[S]uits in equity shall
not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where
plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law”).
132
GOEBEL, supra note 91, at 499–500.
133
Id. at 500.
134
Letter from the Federal Farmer, No. III (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST: OBJECTIONS OF NON-SIGNERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND MAJOR SERIES OF ESSAYS AT THE OUTSET 234, 244 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981).
135
Essays of Brutus No. XI (Jan. 31, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST: OBJECTIONS OF NON-SIGNERS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND MAJOR
SERIES OF ESSAYS AT THE OUTSET, supra note 134, at 417, 420.
136
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 560–61 (7th ed. 2015).
137
Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 (1789).
138
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792).
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in 1912.139 In 1915, Congress permitted cases to be transferred between the equity and law sides of the federal courts, and equitable
defenses to be raised on the common law side “without the necessity
of filing a bill on the equity side of the court.”140 The equity side of
the federal courts operated under the 1915 statute and, with minor
modifications, the Equity Rules of 1912, until the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938.141
III.
THE TWO CONCEPTIONS OF FEDERAL EQUITY
Federal courts administer two distinct conceptions of equity.
The first, which the federal courts have been applying since the
dawn of the Republic, is uniform or homogeneous. When laboring
under this conception, a federal court possesses “authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies
which had been devised and was being administered by the English
Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries.”142 Federal courts sit as national courts administering homogeneous equity throughout the country. Today the homogeneous
conception is reserved for cases where federal courts enforce federal
rights, or when they invoke the equitable remedial rights doctrine.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, the homogeneous conception exhausted federal equity and applied even when
federal courts enforced state-created rights.143 The second conception of federal equity is heterogeneous. If a party requests the federal
court apply equitable doctrine or relief when enforcing a state-created right, then the federal court will apply state law, including state
equity.144 That is the basic holding of Guaranty Trust, which held
that federal equity courts sitting in diversity could not ignore an applicable state statute of limitations when enforcing a state right.145

139

See FALLON ET AL., supra note 136, at 560–61.
Act of Mar. 3, 1915, ch. 90, §§ 274a–274b, 38 Stat. 956, 956 (1915).
141
FALLON ET AL., supra note 136, at 560–61, 564–65.
142
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.
308, 318 (1999) (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568
(1939)); id. at 335 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Atlas Life Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 568).
143
See Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 338.
144
See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945).
145
See id. at 110–12.
140
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The heterogeneity arises because the content of the equity administered by the federal court differs from state to state.
This Part reviews the content and development of the homogeneous and heterogeneous conceptions of federal equity. It shows,
first, that the Supreme Court under Marshall asserted an equitable
homogeneity about ten years before conventionally recognized. This
synchronizes homogeneous federal equity with the expansion of
federal jurisdiction (and increased power of the Supreme Court) in
other areas. Second, after explaining that Frankfurter’s opinion in
Guaranty Trust reimagined Erie as a comprehensive legal philosophy, this Part reveals a deep conceptual tension between the heterogeneous federal equity established by Guaranty Trust and “the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised
and was being administered by the English High Court of Chancery
at the time of the founding.”146 Using Henry Smith’s account of equity as a second-order system, a kind of safety valve, this analysis
suggests that Guaranty Trust obliterated not only homogeneous federal equity, but also a federal court’s capacity to act as a court of
equity when enforcing state-created rights.
A.
Homogeneous Federal Equity
Since their creation, federal courts have applied homogeneous
equity. After Guaranty Trust was decided in 1945, homogeneous
equity only applies when federal courts enforce federal rights or apply what remains of the equitable remedial rights doctrine. But before 1945, federal equity was homogeneous equity, that is, it was
coextensive with the full scope of the equity jurisdiction of the English High Court of Chancery at the Founding.147 In nineteenth-century diversity cases, under the Swift v. Tyson regime, homogeneous
equity governed the equitable aspects of the bill.148 Suppose, for example, that plaintiff sued on a legal right for an equitable remedy.
Then ordinary legal rules governed whether the legal right was violated—say, whether a contract was breached.149 If the federal equity
146

Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 335 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 568).
147
See Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 335 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Atlas Life Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 568.
148
See Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 284.
149
See id. at 283–84.
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court concluded that the contract had been breached, then it would
apply homogeneous equity doctrine to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief.150 Or suppose, taking a different
example, that plaintiff sued on an equitable right—say, plaintiff
sued her trustee or fiduciary.151 Then homogeneous equity governed
the entire lawsuit, because trusts and fiduciaries were not recognized
at law.152 And suppose, as a final example, that plaintiff brought a
simple breach of contract action on the common law side of the federal court, and defendant wanted to raise an equitable defense. The
common law did not recognize equitable defenses, so defendant
would file a bill on the equity side to restrain the proceedings at
law.153 The equity side of the federal court would apply homogeneous equity to determine whether defendant could make out the equitable defense.154
1. ORIGINS: BODLEY AND BROWN (1809)
In 1818 and 1819, the Supreme Court decided two cases that
courts and commentators have credited with definitively establishing that “federal judges applied nonstate uniform equity principles
to determine the applicable procedures, remedies, and—in certain
cases—substantive principles.”155 In Robinson v. Campbell, an action at law for ejectment, the Court excluded evidence proving an
equitable title in the defendant, notwithstanding that such evidence
would have been admitted in the state common law court to make
out an equitable defense.156 Justice Todd held that federal court remedies “are to be, at common law or in equity, not according to the
practice of state courts, but according to the principles of common
law and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from
which we derive our knowledge of those principles.”157 And in
United States v. Howland & Allen, a judgment creditor’s suit filed
150

See, e.g., Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1915).
See generally HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 5.
152
Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 269.
153
J. P. McBaine, Equitable Defenses to Actions at Law in the Federal Courts,
17 CAL. L. REV. 591, 592 (1929).
154
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Bowman, 15 F. Cas. 21 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1858) (No.
8,134).
155
Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 265, 272–75.
156
See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 213, 218–22 (1818).
157
Id. at 222–23.
151
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in equity, the Court held that a state statute providing a remedy at
law did not deprive the federal court of equity jurisdiction.158 Chief
Justice Marshall confirmed that “the Courts of the Union have a
Chancery jurisdiction in every state, and the judiciary act confers the
same Chancery powers on all, and gives the same rule of decision.”159
Entirely missing from this narrative are two cases decided about
a decade before Robinson and Howland & Allen, where the Supreme
Court paved the way for a robust assertion of homogeneous federal
equity. Scholars have overlooked Bodley v. Taylor and Taylor v.
Brown, two cases filed on the equity side of the federal court in Kentucky, where the Court, guided by Marshall, invoked and asserted
homogeneous federal equity after real deliberation.160 The Court had
Bodley under consideration for three years: argument commenced
in February 1806 and a final opinion issued in March 1809.161 In
February 1807, Marshall delivered a one-paragraph opinion “as to a
part only of this case,” holding that a federal court exercising equity
jurisdiction “will proceed according to the principles of equity.”162
In the complete 1809 opinion, Marshall doubled down on homogeneous federal equity. He proclaimed that “the jurisdiction exercised
by a court of chancery is not granted by statute; it is assumed by
itself,” and that “it will exercise that jurisdiction upon its own principles.”163 It seems, then, that in its initial Bodley decision—eleven
years before Robinson, twelve years before Howland & Allen—the
Court decided, after consideration, that federal courts exercise equity jurisdiction according to their own general principles.164
158

See United States v. Howland & Allen, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 115–16
(1819).
159
Id. at 115.
160
See Bodley v. Taylor, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 191, 222 (1809); Taylor v. Brown,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 234, 255 (1809). Patrick Gillen recently quoted some of Marshall’s language from Bodley, but did not discuss it. See Patrick T. Gillen, Preliminary Injunctive Relief Against Governmental Defendants: Trustworthy Shield
or Sword of Damocles?, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 269, 288, 306 n.225 (2016).
161
See Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 200, 221.
162
Id. at 220.
163
Id. at 222.
164
The argument in Brown also provides insight into the early Marshall
Court’s attitude to equity procedure in the lower federal courts. The Supreme
Court would tolerate a deviation from regular chancery procedure if it was an
established state practice that did not produce acute difficulties. At that time, the
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Bodley and Brown were about the application of general equitable principles to Kentucky’s convoluted land law. Kentucky statute
prescribed four steps for the acquisition of land: obtain a warrant
from the governor, file an entry with the county surveyor (which
was placed on public record), survey the land, and return the survey
to the land office.165 The land office then issued a patent, which was
conclusive evidence of legal title.166 But completing prior steps, before a patent issued, conferred equitable interests which a court of
chancery would recognize.167 Importantly, the equitable interests
thus created were specific applications of general equitable princi-

Kentucky federal court sitting in equity impaneled a jury for fact-finding. MARY
K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY
1789-1816, at 180–82 (1978). This was highly unusual. See John H. Langbein,
Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE L. J. 1620,
1625 (1974) [hereinafter Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery]. Marshall emphasized the importance of following proper equity procedure
in federal court, which limited jury fact-finding via the “feigned issue” mechanism. Brown, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 238 (“When the first case of a suit in chancery
of this kind came before this court from Kentucky [viz., Bodley], the court was
struck with the irregularity of the intervention of a jury to ascertain the facts in
any other mode than by an issue directed by the court as a court of chancery; and
as this court is only authorized to proceed in chancery cases according to the principles and usages of courts of equity, the court was disposed to disregard facts
thus found . . . . However, as such a practice was said to have been established in
Kentucky, the court agreed to look into the facts found where they were not inconsistent with the depositions in the cause.”). It may be that the Supreme Court
tolerated this particular deviation from regular chancery procedure because hostility to equity in America partly stemmed from the absence of a jury. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 54–55; see also TACHAU, supra, at 165 (“The [Kentucky federal] judge was an ardent Jeffersonian, and it seems likely that he shared
Jefferson’s conviction that there should be juries in all courts: chancery, admiralty, and ecclesiastical, as well as in common law courts . . . [h]is use of chancery
juries . . . helped avoid even the appearance of tyranny or the arbitrary use of
power.”).
165
See Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, Land Claims, Early, in THE KENTUCKY
ENCYCLOPEDIA 535 (John E. Kleber ed., 2015) [hereinafter Tachau, Land
Claims]. As Mr. Lee put it to the Supreme Court in 1801, “there must be a warrant, an entry and a survey; the warrant being the foundation of the entry, and the
entry directing and controlling the survey.” Wilson v. Mason, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
45, 65 (1801).
166
See Tachau, Land Claims, supra note 165, at 535.
167
See Bodley v. Taylor, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 191, 220–21, 222–23 (1809);
Brown, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 241.
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ples for resolving conflicting interests and priorities; they were necessary because “governors issued warrants with such extravagance.”168 So, for example, filing a valid entry with the county surveyor conferred an equitable interest in the land described.169 In general, if an entry was filed after a patent had issued, then the earlier
legal title prevailed.170 If, however, an entry was filed before a patent
issued, then the patentee took the legal title subject to the earlier equitable interest, because the patentee had constructive notice of the
prior entry (the prior entry was on the public record).171 In such a
case, the patentee held the legal title on trust for the equitable owner:
the equitable owner could repair to a court of equity to compel the
patentee to convey the legal title.172
In Bodley, defendant filed an entry in 1780 and acquired legal
title as patentee in 1786.173 The defendant’s patent, however, included land that was not described in his entry.174 Defendant, therefore, had legal title to surplus land over which he had never acquired
equitable title.175 Plaintiffs claimed that the defendant’s surplus land
was within an entry that they had filed for a parcel of land in 1783,
before defendant had acquired legal title.176 The equity side of the
district court in Kentucky decreed that defendant convey to plaintiffs the legal title to the surplus land.177 In Brown, plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ surveys overlapped, and legal title had been acquired by
both.178 Plaintiffs had surveyed first but patented last, and argued
that defendants had taken legal title over the overlapping land subject to their prior equitable interest.179 The equity side of the federal
district court in Kentucky dismissed plaintiffs’ claim.180
168

Tachau, Land Claims, supra note 165, at 535.
Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 222–23; Brown, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 241.
170
Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 222–23; Brown, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 241,
253–54.
171
Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 222–23, 233; Brown, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 241,
253–54.
172
Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 220–21.
173
Id. at 194.
174
Id. at 192–93, 233–34.
175
Id. at 222, 232–33.
176
Id. at 191–92.
177
Id. at 221.
178
Taylor v. Brown, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 234–35, 247, 255–56 (1809).
179
Id. at 233–34, 241, 253–56.
180
Id. at 234.
169
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In both cases, Marshall framed his opinion in equitable terms: to
resolve the competing equitable priorities. His initial Bodley opinion
in 1807 invoked homogeneous federal equity, holding that a subsequent patentee (the owner at law) is on constructive notice of any
prior entry, and that “the legal title will be considered as holden [i.e.,
held on trust] for him who has the prior equity.”181 In the final 1809
Bodley opinion, Marshall therefore ordered defendant to convey to
plaintiffs “the lands lying within his patent and theirs, which were
not within his entry.”182 And in Brown, Marshall said that “[t]he survey under which the plaintiffs claim, being prior in point of time,
they have the first equitable title, and must prevail . . . unless their
equity is defeated by the circumstances of the case.”183 He held that
their equity was not defeated.184
But Bodley and Brown did not just apply general equitable doctrines. For the first time, the Supreme Court confronted, in Marshall’s words, the “inquiry of vast importance whether . . . a court of
equity acts upon its known, established and general principles, or is
merely substituted for a court of law.”185 The Court expressly asserted a general authority to exercise equity jurisdiction “upon its
own principles,” that is, “the settled principles of a court of chancery.”186 Marshall reached this conclusion by making four important
general observations about the equity side of the federal courts.
First, in Brown, he said that the equity side of the Supreme Court is
not “merely substituted for a court of law, with no other difference
than the power of going beyond the patent.”187 Two weeks later, in
the final Bodley opinion, Marshall made the same point more generally, saying that a court of chancery is not “by statute, substituted
in the place of a court of law, with an express grant of jurisdiction
in the case.”188 In other words, the federal equity court is not a common law court with limited equity powers (as existed in Pennsylvania, where equity was administered through the common law
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 220–21.
Id. at 234.
Brown, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 241.
Id. at 256.
Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 222.
Id. at 222–23.
Brown, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 255.
Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 222.
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forms).189 Instead, the equity side of the federal court is a fullyfledged court of equity, endowed with full chancery powers.
Second, Marshall repeatedly observed that “the jurisdiction exercised by a court of chancery is not granted by statute; it is assumed
by itself,”190 and that jurisdiction “must be exercised upon the
known principles of equity.”191 He noted that a court of chancery
“will afford a remedy which a court of law cannot afford, but since
that remedy is not given by statute, it will be applied by this court as
the principles of equity require its application.”192 Assuming jurisdiction as a court of chancery, the Court “will pay great respect”—
importantly, Marshall did not say the federal court would be
bound—“to all those principles which appear to be well established
in the state in which the lands in controversy lie.”193 The equity side
of the federal court, then, exercised general equity jurisdiction and
was not bound by the equity administered by the state.
Third, Marshall’s vision of federal equity was expansive. The
existence of equitable jurisdiction did not simply “bring[] the validity of the entries before the court” to be resolved by the application
of detailed, technical rules. 194 It also “br[ought] with that question
every other which defeats the equity of the plaintiff.”195 For example, in Bodley, Marshall ordered defendant to convey to plaintiffs
189

See supra Part II.D. Kentucky courts, like the federal courts, had a common
law side and an equity side. See W. Hamilton Bryson, Equity and Equitable Remedies, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF THE
PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES OF LAW 545, 551 (Robert J. Janosik ed.,
1987); Henry H. Ingersoll, Confusion of Law and Equity, 21 YALE L.J. 58, 63–
66, 69 (1911); see also Hamilton v. Hendrix’s Heirs, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 67, 71 (1809);
William E. Bivin, The Historical Development of the Kentucky Courts, 47 KY.
L.J. 465, 477 (1959).
190
Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 222.
191
Brown, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 255. The “theory that federal courts needed
only a grant of jurisdiction, not a statutory cause of action, in order to exercise the
powers of a court of equity” was one of the “traditions . . . exert[ing] a strong
gravitational pull on the nineteenth-century judiciary.” Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 949 (2011) [hereinafter Merrill,
Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of Appellate Review].
192
Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 223.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
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land in defendant’s patent but not in his survey.196 This was land to
which defendant had legal title but which belonged in equity to
plaintiffs. It turned out, however, that plaintiffs themselves were patentees over different land in defendant’s prior survey, that is, which
belonged at law to plaintiffs but in equity to defendant. Marshall
would have ordered that plaintiffs do the equity that they seek. As
he put it, the Court would “furnish no equity to [plaintiffs] against
the legal title which is held by their adversaries, unless they will
submit to the condition of restoring the lands they have gained by
the inadvertence of which they complain.”197 Were this a case of
first impression, then, Marshall would have held that plaintiffs
“ought not to receive a conveyance for the lands within [defendant’s] survey, and not within his entry, but on the condition of their
consenting to convey to him the lands they hold which were within
his entry and are not included in his survey.”198
Finally, consistent with what Story would say more than thirty
years later in Swift v. Tyson, Marshall thought that “in questions respecting title to real estate especially, the same rule ought certainly
to prevail in both [federal and state] courts.”199 In Bodley, although
Marshall was “strongly incline[d]” to require plaintiffs to do the equity that they sought, he did not.200 Referring to the “very extraordinary state of land title” in Kentucky, he applied the “artificial” principle articulated in a series of state court decisions because “[i]t is
impossible to say how many titles might be shaken by shaking the
principle.”201 That is so even though “the principle is really settled
in a manner different from that which this court would deem correct.”202 The ultimate outcome in Bodley, then, was to grant equitable relief to plaintiffs without requiring them to reciprocate.203
In the final result, Bodley and Brown were both cases about real
property and both ultimately applied local law. This is entirely con-

196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203

Id. at 234.
Id.
Id. at 233–34.
Taylor v. Brown, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 234, 255 (1809).
Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 233–34.
Id. at 234.
Id.
See id. at 233–34.
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sistent with Swift, where Story expressly held that federal courts follow state law, not general common law, on “the rights and titles to
real estate.”204 And unlike Robinson and Howland & Allen, Bodley
and Brown do not explicitly say that federal equity jurisdiction is
totally independent of the forum state.205 It is also true that in Bodley, Marshall relied on state law for the conferral of chancery jurisdiction, that is, for “the practice of resorting to a court of chancery
in order to set up an equitable against the legal title.”206 “[B]ut,” he
stated, “in the exercise of that [chancery] jurisdiction, [the federal
court] will proceed according to the principles of equity.”207 In other
words, the federal court followed state practice on whether chancery
jurisdiction existed; but in the exercise of that jurisdiction, the federal court was a fully empowered court of chancery and was not
bound by state equity doctrine. For his part, Marshall—himself a
seasoned equity lawyer208—thought he was saying something “of
vast importance” in concluding that “a court of equity acts upon its
known, established and general principles.”209 Bodley was argued
three times in the Supreme Court and it took three years to issue a
final opinion.210
The assertion in 1809 of a power to decide federal equity cases
on general principles coincides with an emboldened Supreme Court
under Marshall. Just the day before the final Bodley opinion, Marshall delivered Riddle & Co. v. Mandeville.211 Morton Horwitz argued that in Riddle, Marshall, “out of the blue, had invoked an independent equity power to establish the principle of negotiability in
the federal courts.”212 Riddle “was the first clear assertion in the fed-

204

Swift v. Tyson, 42 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
Compare Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222–23 (1818),
and United States v. Howland & Allen, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 115 (1819), with
Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 221–22, and Brown, U.S. (5 Cranch) at 255.
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Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 220–22.
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Id. at 220.
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See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 87–93 (2001).
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Bodley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 222.
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See id. at 200, 221.
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9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 322 (1809).
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MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
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eral courts of the idea that a general commercial law existed independently of the decisional law of the states.”213 And just three short
weeks before the final Bodley opinion, Marshall had delivered “the
Court’s sweeping assertion of jurisdiction”214 in United States v. Peters.215
2. A NATIONAL EQUITY POWER FOR WESTWARD EXPANSION
Collins explains the evolution of homogeneous federal equity
after Robinson in terms of the institutional capacity of the federal
judicial system.216 Although it is tempting to situate homogeneous
equity in the standard narrative of federal court aggrandizement and
empowerment, Collins argues that uniform federal equity also
served an institutional purpose. Homogeneous equity is not simply
evidence of the concentration of federal court power at the expense
of the states; it is also “evidence of an effort to ensure litigant equality and uniform administration of justice throughout the federal judicial system.”217 In Collins’s view, the failure of the federal courts
to match westward territorial expansion, and the significant disparity of state equity, motivated the Court to “use[] uniform equity as
one way to secure a modicum of horizontal consistency throughout
the federal judicial system.”218
3. MATURITY AND ENTRENCHMENT IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY
Homogeneous federal equity came of age during the mid-nineteenth century.219 Dane’s first abridgment, published in 1824, cited
213

Id.
NEWMYER, supra note 208, at 206–07.
215
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809).
216
See Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 292–98.
217
Id. at 300–01.
218
Id. at 292–93.
219
See generally A. J. PEELER, A TREATISE ON LAW AND EQUITY AS
DISTINGUISHED AND ENFORCED IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 334 (Austin, Swindells Printing House 1883); GEO. TUCKER BISPHAM & SHARSWOOD
BRINTON, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY 22 (8th ed. 1909); Pratt v. Northam, 19
F. Cas. 1254, 1258 (C.C.D.R.I. 1828) (No. 11,376); Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 648, 658 (1832); Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 655–57 (1835);
Gordon v. Hobart, 10 F. Cas. 795, 797 (C.C.D. Me. 1836) (No. 5,609); Barber v.
214

2017]

OUR EQUITY: FEDERALISM AND CHANCERY

209

Howland & Allen for the proposition that “[t]he Federal circuit
courts have jurisdiction in equity in every State, and in all the same
powers and rules of decision.”220 By 1850 it was uncontroversial
that “[t]he chancery jurisdiction given by the Constitution and laws
of the United States is the same in all the States of the Union, and
the rule of decision is the same in all.”221 The starkest example of
homogeneity arose from a couple’s agreement made in contemplation of marriage.222 After the surviving spouse died, the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that only the couple’s children could sue in
equity to enforce the marriage agreement.223 The wife’s first cousins
could not.224 But when the husband’s brother and nephew sued in
federal court to enforce the agreement—not just the same kind of
agreement, but the same exact agreement considered in the state
court proceedings—the U.S. Supreme Court “d[id] not consider

Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 591–92 (1858); Green’s Adm’x v. Creighton, 64
U.S. (23 How.) 90, 105 (1860); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1868);
Camblos v. Phila. & R.R. Co.-Dinsmore, 4 F. Cas. 1089, 1097, 1098–99
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1873) (No. 2,331) (counsel agreed that federal equity was uniform);
Smith v. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 398, 401 (1878); Ridings v. Johnson, 128 U.S. 212,
217 (1888); JOHN MITFORD, A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE
COURT OF CHANCERY BY ENGLISH BILL 19–20 n.1 (Charles Edwards ed., New
York, John S. Voorhies, 5th Am. ed. 1844); GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS,
COMMENTARIES ON THE JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 25–26, 29 (Philadelphia,
T. & J.W. Johnson 1854); ROGER FOSTER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY ACTS OF 1875
AND 1887, at 16–19 (New York, L. K. Strouse & Co. 1887); 1 CHARLES FISK
BEACH, JR., MODERN EQUITY: COMMENTARIES ON MODERN EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 7 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1892); JAMES W. EATON,
HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 20, 20 n.4 (1901); ARCHIBALD H.
THROCKMORTON, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 2–3 (1913).
220
7 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN
LAW 557 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1824).
221
BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, FORMS IN CHANCERY, ADMIRALTY, AND AT
COMMON LAW; ADAPTED TO THE PRACTICE OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
289 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1842) (quoting Boyle v. Zacharie,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648, 658 (1832)).
222
See generally Neves v. Scott (Neves I), 50 U.S. (9 How.) 196, 210, 213
(1850); Neves v. Scott (Neves II), 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268, 270, 272 (1851).
223
Merritt v. Scott, 6 Ga. 563, 573 (1849) (“Equity will not enforce a specific
performance [of a marriage agreement], at the instance of a volunteer, although
so near a relation as a brother or sister . . .”).
224
Id. at 573–74.
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th[e] decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia a binding authority,”225 and granted relief.226 The Court asserted the uniformity of
federal equity principles, saying that “it is for the courts of the
United States . . . to decide what those principles are, and to apply
such of them, to each particular case, as they may find justly applicable thereto.”227 The disagreement between the two supreme courts
was internal to equity doctrine. The federal court noted that “the Supreme Court of Georgia, as well as this court, has resorted to the
decisions of the High Court of Chancery in England, and to approved writers on equity jurisprudence, as affording the proper
guides to a correct decision.”228 It was a debate over who was right,
not who was supreme.229
The power and persistence of the homogeneous conception of
federal equity derived from its perceived constitutional status. In
1832, Justice Story observed that “[t]he Chancery jurisdiction [is]
given by the constitution and laws of the United States.”230 Its constitutional status was most aggressively asserted by Chief Justice
Taney in 1850, holding that “the adoption of the State practice must
not be understood as confounding the principles of law and equity,
nor as authorizing legal and equitable claims to be blended together
in one suit,” because “[t]he Constitution of the United States, in creating and defining the judicial power of the general government, establishes this distinction between law and equity.”231 Taney’s opinion underwrote the constitutional entrenchment of the law/equity
distinction for decades.232
225

Neves II, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 272.
Id. at 273.
227
Id. at 272.
228
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229
The Supreme Court of Georgia later adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach even though it was not required to do so. Cartledge v. Cutliff, 29 Ga. 758,
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See, e.g., Fenn v. Holme, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 481, 485 (1858); Thompson
v. R.R. Cos., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134, 137 (1867); Noonan v. Lee, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
499, 509 (1862); Butler v. Young, 4 F. Cas. 916, 917 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1872) (No.
2,245); Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499, 512 (1892); Gravenberg v. Laws, 100
F. 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1900); Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., 123 F. 506, 517 (C.C.D. Del.
1903); Gray v. Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co., 156 F. 736, 741 (7th Cir. 1907); Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Syas, 246 F. 561, 566 (8th Cir. 1917); Keatley v. U.S. Trust Co.,
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4. FEDERAL RIGHTS
a.
Private Law
Today federal courts apply homogeneous equity when enforcing
federal rights.233 One year after Guaranty Trust, Frankfurter distinguished “the duty of a federal court, sitting as it were as a court of a
State, to approximate as closely as may be State law in order to vindicate without discrimination a right derived solely from a State,”
from “the duty of federal courts, sitting as national courts throughout
the country, to apply their own principles in enforcing an equitable
right created by Congress.”234 And since 1999, the battle over federal equity has occurred on territory staked out by Grupo Mexicano.235 In that case, the Supreme Court held that federal courts
lacked power to issue an injunction restraining defendants from
dealing with assets pending resolution of the lawsuit—what is
known elsewhere as a Mareva injunction.236 Plaintiffs, concerned
about defendant’s imminent insolvency, secured a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from dealing with its remaining substantial asset.237 Justice Scalia, writing for a bare majority, held that
the district court had acted beyond its equitable authority because
such orders were unknown to the High Court of Chancery in England in 1789.238 He also suggested that the authority to issue such
injunctions “could render Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64, which

249 F. 296, 298 (2d Cir. 1918); Woodlawn Farm Dairy Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 282
F. 278, 279 (M.D. Pa. 1921); Trubenizing Process Corp. v. Jacobson, 10 F. Supp.
655, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
233
See e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395–98 (1946).
234
Id. at 395; see also id. at 397 (“We conclude that the decision in the York
case is inapplicable to the enforcement of federal equitable rights.”).
235
See generally Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund,
Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999).
236
See id. at 333; see also Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. Int’l Bulkcarriers
S.A. [1980] 1 All E.R. 213, 213, 214–15 (Eng.).
237
Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 312–13.
238
Id. at 333. This view has long pedigree. See Baker v. Biddle, 2 F. Cas. 439,
447–48, 452–53 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 764) (“We cannot adopt any rules or
principles of the law, which are in contradiction to those which were settled and
established before the Revolution.”).
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authorizes use of state prejudgment remedies, a virtual irrelevance.”239 Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, thought that this was “an unjustifiably static conception of equity jurisdiction.”240 The debate
between Scalia and Ginsburg was methodological, and Scalia’s historical approach prevailed.241
The Court’s recent equity jurisprudence has been dominated by
ERISA’s authorization of “appropriate equitable relief.”242 Since
2002, the Court has decided five cases interpreting that statutory
phrase and, with one exception, those cases present the same general
fact pattern: a health plan fiduciary brings a claim against a tortaward-winning beneficiary seeking monetary reimbursement for
medical expenses that the plan had paid on the beneficiary’s behalf.243 Because compensatory damages are quintessentially a legal
remedy, fiduciaries must characterize their claim as typically available in equity244—for example, the enforcement of a lien or equitable restitution. To determine whether the fiduciary’s request for reimbursement is an example of “appropriate equitable relief,” the
Court consults “standard treatises on equity, which establish ‘the
239

Id. at 330–31. Of course, Scalia’s reasoning only works if state law provides an analogous remedy. See FED. R. CIV. P. 64(a) (making available “every
remedy . . . that, under the law of the state where the court is located, provides for
seizing a person or property to secure satisfaction of the potential judgment”).
240
Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
241
See Bray, supra note 110, at 1011; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing
Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 34–35 (2004) (observing that the dispute
between Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia over originalist methodology was illustrated in, inter alia, Grupo Mexicano).
242
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012) (authorizing plan fiduciaries to file civil
suits “to obtain . . . appropriate equitable relief . . . to enforce . . . the terms of the
plan”). See generally John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By “Equitable”: The
Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1318, 1317–21 (2003).
243
Compare Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204,
206, 208 (2002), and Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 359
(2006), and US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1543–44 (2013),
and Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 136 S.
Ct. 651, 655–56 (2016), with CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 424–25
(2011) (claim brought by beneficiaries of pension plan challenging fiduciary’s
adoption of a new plan partly on the basis that fiduciary’s disclosures had failed
to give proper notice of changes to benefits, which in certain respects were less
generous).
244
See, e.g., Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210.
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basic contours’ of what equitable relief was typically available in
premerger equity courts.”245
b.
Public Law
In public law, Owen Fiss explicitly recognized the interaction
between equity and federalism, and he protested the Supreme
Court’s invocation of the vocabulary of equity to obscure decisions
that were really about federalism.246 In Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
for example, the Court reversed the district court’s order enjoining
the city and its mayor from enforcing an unconstitutional solicitation
ordinance.247 The Court deployed the “familiar rule that courts of
equity do not ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions” to enforce
Congress’s “policy . . . of leaving generally to the state courts the
trial of criminal cases arising under state laws, subject to review by
this Court of any federal questions involved.”248 Absent exceptional
circumstances—defined in traditionally equitable terms as preventing clear and imminent irreparable injury—a federal equity court
should refuse “to interfere with or embarrass threatened proceedings
in state courts.”249 And “equitable remedies infringing this independence of the states—though they might otherwise be given—
should be withheld if sought on slight or inconsequential
grounds.”250 For Fiss, these are “statement[s] about the structure of
American federalism cast in the language of equity,” which
“claimed both that a vital principle of federalism was threatened by
the injunctive suit, and that the doctrines of equity should be used to
protect that principle.”251 Ultimately, Fiss argued, using the rhetoric
and “doctrines of equity—doctrines forged in the battles of English

245

Montanile, 136 S. Ct. at 657 (quoting Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217). Samuel Bray has argued that the Court’s approach to ERISA’s authorization of equitable relief is characterized by invoking the tradition of equity, but that this tradition is, in fact, a judicially constructed ideal. See generally Bray, supra note 124,
at 1014–16, 1022.
246
Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1103–12, 1116–119, 1121
(1977).
247
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 159–60, 166 (1943).
248
Id. at 163.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Fiss, supra note 246, at 1106–07.
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Chancery—to further views of federalism, a political principle central to American government . . . . was a kind of legal prestidigitation.”252 And, as Douglas Laycock eloquently detailed, the Supreme
Court got the equitable doctrine wrong.253
Fiss’s primary target was Dombrowski v. Pfister, which authorized a federal court to enjoin state criminal prosecutions forming
part of a plan of arrests, seizures and threats of prosecution that were
designed to harass and discourage the vindication of constitutional
rights.254 The Court held that, on the facts presented, irreparable injury was established and an injunction should issue.255 Thus, Fiss
noted, “[t]he linkage between the two realms of discourse—federalism and equity—was preserved” from Douglas.256 The equitable
doctrines, however, “were reinterpreted” and “made to bend to a
new vision of federalism, one that posited the federal courts as the
primary guardian of constitutional rights.”257 One of Fiss’s basic
points is that this reasoning is doubletalk: “[t]hough steeped in the
language of equitable remedies, Dombrowski was of course not a
struggle about remedies but about judges.”258 In its appeal to the irreparable injury rule, Dombrowski “suggests that a point is being
made about remedies, when in truth a point is being made about the
structure of the federal system, one that stands independent of the
remedy.”259 Dombrowski’s “altered vision of federalism . . . remained submerged, silent beneath the smooth manipulation of equity doctrine.”260 Fiss praised the tendency of later cases to cast off
the “shackles of . . . the ill-founded tradition of using the language
of equity to safeguard federal structure.”261
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Id. at 1107.
See Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The
Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 224–28 (1977); DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 134–36 (1991) [hereinafter LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE].
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Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484–85, 487–89, 497 (1965).
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Id. at 489, 497.
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Fiss, supra note 246, at 1103.
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Id.
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Id. at 1116.
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Id. at 1107.
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Id. at 1117.
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Id. at 1163.
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This tactic—manipulating equitable doctrine to safeguard federalism—is as old as the Republic. Laycock observed that it dates at
least to Ex parte Young, decided in 1908.262 Part IV demonstrates
that the Supreme Court used equity to reinforce federalism as early
as 1793. To be sure, the early federal courts did not deploy equity to
position themselves as the primary guardian of constitutional rights;
instead they used equity to signal the continued dominance of the
states.263 Nevertheless, the early federal courts reinforced the nascent federalism using an equitable vocabulary.264
B.
Heterogeneous Federal Equity
For the federal courts, 1938 was a big year. In April, the Court
decided Erie, and in September the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect.265 Promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure realized the
Act’s conferral of authority on the Court to “unite the general rules
prescribed by [the Court] for cases in equity with those in actions at
law so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for
both.”266 Justice Brandeis wrote the Court’s opinion in Erie,267 but
was the only Justice who expressed disapproval of the adoption of
the Rules.268 The Rules and Erie effected a revolution, procedurally
262

See Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The
Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 636, 639 (1979) [hereinafter
Laycock, The Cases Dombrowski Forgot]; LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY
RULE, supra note 253, at 134–36.
263
See Laycock, The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, supra note 262, at 639; see
also Fiss, supra note 246, at 1127.
264
See Laycock, The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, supra note 262, at 639; Fiss,
supra note 246, at 1163.
265
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938). See generally
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 113TH CONG., FED. R. CIV. PRO. WITH FORMS, vii
(Comm. Print 2014).
266
Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73–415, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
267
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 64.
268
See Letter from Charles E. Hughes, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, to Homer Cummings, Attorney Gen. (Dec. 20, 1937), 308 U.S. 649,
649 (“I am requested to state that Mr. Justice Brandeis does not approve of the
adoption of the rules.”); see also EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 135–36 (2000).
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and substantively, in federal equity.269 An immediate consequence
was the abolition of the separate common law and equity sides of
the federal courts. And, after Guaranty Trust, federal courts enforcing state-created rights applied state rather than federal equity.270
Erie holds that, absent applicable federal law, substantive state
law (including the decisions of the state’s courts) governs state
claims litigated in federal court.271 Erie operates primarily in diversity cases; in general, federal courts apply state law when enforcing
state rights of action.272 And of course, Erie is more than the command that state law governs substantive issues in diversity cases: it
repudiated federal general common law.273 It approved Justice
Holmes’s criticism of Swift v. Tyson as resting on the invalid assumption that there is “a transcendental body of law outside of any
particular State but obligatory within it.”274 In Guaranty Trust,
Frankfurter said that Erie “did not merely overrule a venerable

269

See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420–21 (2011).
See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945); Henry J. Friendly,
In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383,
396–97 n.65 (1964).
271
“Erie . . . required ‘federal courts [to] follow state decisions on matters of
substantive law appropriately cognizable by the states.’” Am. Elec., 564 U.S. 410,
421 (2011) (quoting Friendly, supra note 270, at 422). See also Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889, 892 (1974) [hereinafter Monaghan,
Book Review] (“Erie is . . . a limitation on the federal court’s power to displace
state law absent some relevant constitutional or statutory mandate . . . .”); John
Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 696 (1974);
Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 921, 924 (2013) (“Whatever else it did, Erie abandoned what it
repeatedly called ‘the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.’”); Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out
of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV.
129, 133 (2011) (“In Erie, the Court overruled Swift and held that in adjudicating
state-law claims, federal courts should apply both state statutes and state common
law.”); Michael S. Greve & Richard A. Epstein, Introduction: Erie Railroad at
Seventy-Five, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2013); Ernest A. Young, A General
Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17, 18 (2013).
272
See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see
also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988); Houben v. Telular Corp., 309
F.3d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 2002).
273
“There is no federal general common law.” Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
274
Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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case,” but “overruled a particular way of looking at law.”275 Erie
“implicates, indeed perhaps it is, the very essence of our federalism.”276 What then is equity’s place in Erie’s conception of judicial
federalism? Is equity a particular way of looking at law that is irreconcilable with Erie? Is it inescapably a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular state but obligatory within it?
1. GUARANTY TRUST CO. V. YORK: EQUITY AND ERIE
In Guaranty Trust, Frankfurter confronted the question of
whether, in a suit brought on its equity side, a federal district court
sitting in diversity was required to apply the state’s statute of limitations. Petitioner Guaranty Trust, a trustee with power and obligations to enforce rights of noteholders in a third-party corporation,
cooperated in a plan for the cash purchase of notes.277 The offer was
to exchange each note for half its face value plus twenty shares.278
Non-accepting noteholders brought a class action, solely based on
diversity, alleging breach of trust by petitioner in failing to protect
noteholders’ interests when it assented to the exchange offer, and in
failing to disclose its own interest when sponsoring the offer.279 The
Second Circuit held that the district court sitting in diversity was
“not required to apply the State statute of limitations that would govern like suits in” state court.280
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Frankfurter’s opinion divided in half. The first half brimmed with theory and history,
and established that Erie applies to equity cases. Frankfurter reimagined Erie as a comprehensive legal philosophy. In stark contrast to
Brandeis’s concise and “perhaps even gnomic” opinion in Erie,281
Frankfurter swooped from jurisprudential heights. Swift v. Tyson, he
said, embodied “a particular way of looking at law which dominated
the judicial process long after its inadequacies had been laid

275
276
277
278
279
280
281

Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945).
Ely, supra note 271, at 695.
Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 100.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 100–101.
PURCELL, supra note 268, at 156.
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bare.”282 In 1842, “Law was conceived as a ‘brooding omnipresence’ of Reason, of which decisions were merely evidence and not
themselves the controlling formulations.”283 Federal diversity courts
were “free to ascertain what Reason, and therefore Law, required
wholly independent of authoritatively declared State law.”284 This
“impulse to freedom” was “strongly rooted in . . . the nature of
law.”285 Swift, then, “summed up prior attitudes and expressions”
and “was congenial to the jurisprudential climate of the time.”286 It
held that “State court decisions were not ‘the law’ but merely someone’s opinion . . . concerning the content of this all-pervading law,”
and “federal courts assumed power to find for themselves the content of such a body of law.”287
This may, of course, correctly encapsulate the “jurisprudential
climate” of the 1840s.288 But Erie said none of it. To be sure,
Brandeis famously held that “[t]here is no federal general common
law.”289 Yet the closest Brandeis got to waxing lyrical about jurisprudential climates were a few quotes from Holmes, including that
“law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist
without some definite authority behind it.”290 In Guaranty Trust,
however, Frankfurter simply needed to establish a major premise:
Swift embodied antiquated nineteenth-century views about the nature of law. And if Swift represented a conception of law, Erie must
represent its philosophical opposite.
Frankfurter then linked homogeneous federal equity to Swift.
Recognizing the deep doctrinal pedigree of homogeneous federal
equity, Frankfurter noted that Swift “was merely another expression
of the ideas put forth in the equity cases.”291 Federal equity courts
were particularly sympathetic to “sentiments for uniformity of decision and freedom from diversity in State law . . . because equitable
282

Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 101.
Id. at 102.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id. at 102–03.
287
Id. at 103.
288
Id.
289
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doctrines are so often cast in terms of universal applicability.”292
Logically, this was sufficient to decide the case: homogeneous equity was a manifestation of Swift’s conception of law, which Erie
overruled.
But Frankfurter went further, making the strong historical claim
that federal diversity courts, “in the long course of their history, have
not differentiated in their regard for State law between actions at law
and suits in equity.”293 The Rules of Decision Act, he explained,
“was deemed, consistently for over a hundred years, to be merely
declaratory of what would in any event have governed the federal
courts and therefore was equally applicable to equity suits.”294 This
strong historical claim depended crucially on Frankfurter’s distinction between rights and remedies. On state-created rights, he argued,
“Congress never gave, nor did the federal courts ever claim, the
power to deny substantive rights created by State law or to create
substantive rights denied by State law.”295 On remedies, things were
different. “This does not mean,” he cautioned, “that whatever equitable remedy is available in a State court must be available in a diversity suit in a federal court, or conversely, that a federal court may
not afford an equitable remedy not available in a State court.”296
There are well-known constitutional and statutory limitations on equity in federal courts.297 It follows, said Frankfurter, that states cannot define the remedies a federal diversity court “must” give, and
that a federal diversity court “may” give equitable relief when a state
292

Id. at 103.
Id.
294
Id. at 103–04.
295
Id. at 105. Frankfurter himself knew the doubtful accuracy of this historical
claim. See Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 339; supra Part III.A.3. William Crosskey argued stridently against it. See WILLIAM
WINSLOW CROSSKEY, 11 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 877–902 (1953).
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Guar. Tr. Co., 326 U.S. at 105.
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“Equitable relief in a federal court is of course subject to restrictions: the
suit must be within the traditional scope of equity as historically evolved in the
English Court of Chancery; a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law must
be wanting; explicit Congressional curtailment of equity powers must be respected; the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be evaded. That a State may
authorize its courts to give equitable relief unhampered by any or all such restrictions cannot remove these fetters from the federal courts.” Id. at 105–06 (citations omitted).
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court cannot.298 Federal diversity courts enforced state-created
rights “if the mode of proceeding and remedy were consonant with
the traditional body of equitable remedies, practice and procedure.”299
Frankfurter thus adeptly deployed a strikingly impoverished
conception of equity by maintaining an artificially sharp distinction
between rights and remedies, and cramming homogeneous federal
equity into an artificially narrow remedial domain. He paid lip service to the “good deal of talk in the cases that federal equity is a
separate legal system”300 and to the “talk of freedom of equity from
. . . State statutes of limitations.”301 He approved “[d]icta . . . characterizing equity as an independent body of law.”302 Frankfurter’s
vision of equity, however, was merely remedial because “this system of equity ‘derived its doctrines, as well as its powers, from its
mode of giving relief.’”303 A homogeneous conception of federal
equity only existed in this limited domain of equitable remedial
rights.
The second half of Frankfurter’s opinion articulated a cryptic,
“outcome-determinative” standard for applying Erie.304 Eschewing
a general substance/procedure distinction, Frankfurter phrased the
Erie test in a few different ways: litigation in federal court cannot
“substantially affect the enforcement of the right” or “significantly
affect the outcome of a litigation” or “lead to a substantially different result.”305 Erie, said Frankfurter, expressed a “policy” that “the
outcome of the litigation . . . should be substantially the same, so far
as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if
tried in a State court.”306 He cataloged some of the legal rules gov-
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Id. at 111.
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Id. at 105 (quoting C. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING
xxvii (Cambridge, Charles W. Sever 1877)).
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Id. at 109 (“[D]oes it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon
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erned by state law: burden of proof, conflict of laws, and contributory negligence.307 Similarly, he held, because a statute of limitation
“bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely formally or
negligibly,” and enacts “consequences that so intimately affect recovery or non-recovery,” federal diversity courts should follow state
law.308
Understandably, the consistency of the equitable remedial rights
doctrine and the outcome-determinative test drew skepticism.309
Most important for current purposes, though, is that Frankfurter
“eviscerated the federal uniform equity doctrine, largely ending equity’s reign as a distinctive site of nonstate, judge-made law in federal diversity jurisdiction cases.”310 In a phone call to Frankfurter,
Chief Justice Stone lauded his “considerable surgical operation”
which excised “a good deal more of historical material . . . than the
uninformed reader might realize.”311
2. LEGAL PROGRESSIVISM
Collins has eloquently chronicled Frankfurter’s central role in
the diminution of federal equity.312 Frankfurter waged a decadeslong scholarly and political campaign against diversity jurisdiction
and federal equity. Frankfurter published work, encouraged students, and agitated Congress in pursuit of two intertwined goals:
abolish diversity jurisdiction and limit federal equity.313 There were
larger political objectives. From at least the late 1920s, as Brandeis’s
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“de facto agent,”314 Frankfurter had “drap[ed] his legal Progressivism in neutral scientific and professional language.”315 Diversity jurisdiction and the general common law it enforced favored corporate
interests;316 and equitable injunctions enjoined industrial action, effectively conscripting workers.317 In Brandeis’s memorable phrase,
the labor injunction “reminds of involuntary servitude.”318 Frankfurter gratefully received the opportunity presented by Guaranty Trust
to limit diversity jurisdiction and federal equity in one fell swoop.
3. CONCEPTUAL TROUBLES: ERIE’S CHANCERY PROBLEM
Frankfurter grounded a federal diversity court’s equitable powers wholly on a line plucked from Langdell’s treatise: “this system
of equity ‘derived its doctrines, as well as its powers, from its mode
of giving relief.’”319 But that is not the whole story, as Langdell himself emphasized:
Of course, however, it must not be supposed that equity in modern times is simply a different system of
remedies from those administered in courts of law;
for there are many extensive doctrines in equity, and
some whole branches of law, which are unknown to
the common-law courts.320
The first edition of Hart and Wechsler’s famous casebook
quoted this passage but then observed that “traditional equity was
not . . . a system merely of distinctive remedies without distinctive
substantive consequences.”321 Hart and Wechsler highlighted “familiar examples, such as trusts,” and “also the many equitable defenses, enforced by separate bill in equity, by which the chancellor,
314
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having as always the last word, destroyed interests which the law
did recognize, so as to reach a wholly different substantive result.”322 If equity is remedial, as Frankfurter held, then it is hard to
see how any remedy or remedial doctrine is not outcome-determinative, unless outcome is taken to “refer only to which party prevails, and not to the form of relief given.”323 Equity is outcome-determinative vis-à-vis the common law, “[a]nd once the general principle was transposed into the federal system, equity was by its very
nature outcome determinative vis-à-vis state law.”324
Frankfurter’s remedial conception of equity was not only descriptively wrong but normatively vulnerable. Henry Hart suggested
a defense of homogeneous federal equity by reference to a 1915 diversity case, Guffey v. Smith.325 In Guffey, holders of an oil and gas
lease with an option to surrender sought to enjoin operations under
a later lease.326 Illinois courts did not enforce in equity an oil and
gas lease containing an option to surrender.327 The Supreme Court
afforded equitable relief, appealing to homogeneous federal equity.328 After Guaranty Trust cast serious doubt on the continued
vitality of Guffey,329 Hart famously wondered:
Can Guffey be defended on the ground that the federal court was merely giving a fuller and fairer remedy in the enforcement of state-created rights and obligations than the state courts would give? Does it offend the constitutional plan, or any valid principle of
federalism, to have the federal courts administer in
favor of diverse citizens, this kind of juster justice?
An affirmative answer would require, would it not, a
root-and-branch repudiation of the tradition of federal equity in its positive aspects?330
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324
325
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327
328
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330

Id.
Past and Present, supra note 14, at 841.
Collins, A Considerable Surgical Operation, supra note 8, at 341–42.
237 U.S. 101 (1915). See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 110, at 652.
See Guffey, 237 U.S. at 108–09.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 114–17.
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 110, at 650.
Id. at 652.
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For Hart, the equity jurisdiction of federal diversity courts empowered them to enforce state-created rights better than the state courts
themselves.331 A federal equity court would thereby vindicate the
very purpose of diversity jurisdiction.332 Frankfurter’s remedial conception not only narrowed the word “equity” used in Article III and
the first Judiciary Act,333 it also frustrated the point of diversity jurisdiction.
After Frankfurter’s intervention in Guaranty Trust, it is not obvious that federal diversity courts, deprived of the ability to administer a juster justice, are capable of sitting as courts of equity. Erie
took aim at the “doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,”334 where Justice Story
held that principles of general commercial law (the law merchant)
were not “laws of the several states” to which the Rules of Decision
Act referred.335 Federal courts, said Story, could decide questions of
general common law independently of the states.336 The Rules of
Decision Act did not apply “to questions of a more general nature,”
such as “the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments,” or to “questions of general commercial law,” where answers were to be found “not in the decisions of the local tribunals,
but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.”337 That is because neither federal nor state courts could
claim authority over the general common law. In that domain:

331
Id. See also PURCELL, supra note 268, at 249–50 (“Hart repeatedly insisted
that the federal courts were capable of providing—indeed, that they were specifically designed to provide—a ‘juster justice’ than the state courts.”), 251 (in a letter
Hart wrote that Guaranty Trust “leaves the diversity jurisdiction without intelligible rationale—or at least without a function of any consequence”).
332
Id. See also Monaghan, Book Review, supra note 271, at 893 n.20 (suggesting that “the federal diversity court’s ‘interest’ . . . in providing ‘juster justice’
than that available under state law” is ensuring that substantive, state-created
rights and obligations are vindicated).
333
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat.
73, 82 (1789).
334
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938) (emphasis added).
335
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842). See Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(2012)).
336
Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19.
337
Id. at 18–19.
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[T]he state tribunals are called upon to perform the
like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon
general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the
true exposition of the contract or instrument, or what
is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the case . . . . Undoubtedly, the
decision of the local tribunals upon such subjects are
entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this Court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which
our own judgments are to be bound up and governed.338
Story’s description of the general common law aligns with his
conception of federal equity. Ten years before he wrote the Swift
opinion, Story said that the exercise of equity jurisdiction in federal
court “was to be decided by the general principles of courts of equity, and not by any peculiar statute enactments of the State.”339 By
1850, the Supreme Court had fully internalized the analogy. On equitable principles, both state and federal courts “resort[] to the decisions of the High Court of Chancery in England, and to approved
writers on equity jurisprudence, as affording the proper guides to a
correct decision.”340 But “it is for the courts of the United States,
and for this court in the last resort, to decide what those principles
are, and to apply such of them, to each particular case, as they may
find justly applicable thereto.”341 And “we do not consider this decision of the [state court] a binding authority.”342
Frankfurter seized on this in Guaranty Trust and held that homogeneous federal equity was hopelessly incompatible with Erie’s
vision of judicial federalism. As noted in Part III.B.1, Frankfurter
thought that Swift itself was merely a symptom of the homogeneity
expressed by federal courts of equity. The devastating Holmesian
aphorisms followed thick and fast: uniform federal equity was just

338
339
340
341
342

Id.
Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648, 658 (1832).
See, e.g., Neves II, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268, 271 (1851).
Id. at 272.
Id.
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another brooding omnipresence and transcendental body.343 The
true position, said Frankfurter, is that “a federal court adjudicating a
State-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of
the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the
State.”344
Guaranty Trust, in dictating that federal equity courts sitting in
diversity must slavishly follow state law, certainly made the “occasion for the enforcement of equitable doctrine” a rare occurrence.345
Henry Smith’s functional account of equity demonstrates this.346
Equity, Smith argues, is a second-order intervention to deal with
complex and uncertain problems like opportunism.347 It is secondorder because it is “law about law”: equity takes as given the result
at common law, and modifies or supplements that result according
to its institutionalized conscience.348 Complex problems like opportunism, which cannot be captured ex ante, are amenable to secondorder intervention.349 Smith cautions against a comprehensive procedural merger of law and equity because it makes equity first-order
rather than second-order.350 The result is a “flattening” of remedies,351 where equity’s traditionally second-order intervention is replaced by multifactor tests and standards—“the closest mono-level
substitute for a second-order safety valve.”352 The federal courts, as
long as they retained status as a separate court system, had scope to
implement a second-order check on state law. In Guaranty Trust,
Frankfurter did all he could to deprive the federal diversity courts of
their ability to act as a second-order check.353 Positioning a federal
equity court sitting in diversity as simply another court of the state
343

Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1945).
Id.
345
Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 887 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, C.J.,
dissenting) (“Equity follows the law, but not slavishly nor always. If it did, there
could never be occasion for the enforcement of equitable doctrine.”) (citation
omitted).
346
See generally Smith, supra note 55, at 175–76, 185–88.
347
Id. at 184.
348
Id. at 175–76, 181–82.
349
See id. 175–76, 180–81, 184.
350
Id. at 185–87.
351
Id. at 193–95.
352
Id. at 188.
353
See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
344
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deprives the court of its power to launch a second-order intervention.
Of course, if state courts take a traditionally equitable approach
to a state statute of limitations, then a federal court, sitting in diversity, is entitled to do likewise. But to a certain extent, even this version of equitable power is illusory. It is, first, solely contingent on
the state’s continuing commitment to traditional equity.354 Second,
it nevertheless cabins the federal court’s discretion and changes the
nature of the federal court’s inquiry. Under Guaranty Trust’s regime
of heterogeneous federal equity, the standard of correctness for an
equitable decision is necessarily pegged to the state. To paraphrase
Story, the federal diversity courts are not ascertaining upon general
reasoning and legal analogies the just rule furnished by the principles of equity to govern the case.355 Instead, they put themselves in
the shoes of a legal fiction: an ideal construct of a state court. The
federal equity court sitting in diversity does not ask, “What is equitable?” It asks, “What would a state court think is equitable?”356
The argument should not be pushed too far. Samuel Bray has
argued that federal courts construct an ideal vision of equity even in
federal question cases, and there may be no real difference between
constructing an ideal doctrine and constructing an ideal court applying some variation of that doctrine.357 Perhaps, too, the common law
method itself can be abstractly described as courts constructing an
ideal doctrine. For current purposes, it suffices to observe that federal equity courts seem to engage in different inquiries when exercising diversity and federal question jurisdiction; and when sitting
in diversity, they cannot decide equitable doctrine based on their
354

See, e.g., Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 500 (2d Cir. 1953) (“If the
highest court of a State rules that, in a certain class of cases, equity is stripped of
all discretion and must always grant, automatically, a perpetual injunction, then
(say my colleagues) thanks to Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York, a
federal court, sitting in that State in a diversity case falling within that class of
cases, must likewise surrender all discretion and mechanically issue a perpetual
injunction.”) (Frank, J., dissenting as to the nature of the relief) (citation omitted).
355
Cf. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
356
Henry Hart observed in 1954 that “recent Supreme Court decisions . . . ask
only what the courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting would do.”
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 489, 511 n.75 (1954).
357
See Bray, supra note 110, at 1001.
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own principles—they must defer. Federal diversity courts, therefore,
are limited-purpose courts of equity: they are courts of equity only
to the extent state courts are.
Not everyone shares the view that Guaranty Trust strengthened
Erie and shoehorned federal equity into an artificially narrow remedial conception. In a recent paper, Michael Morley contended the
opposite: Guaranty Trust “confirmed the vitality of independent
federal equity law” by “preserv[ing] the ‘equitable remedial rights
doctrine,’ which requires federal courts to apply a uniform body of
federal equitable principles . . . rather than state law, to decide
whether to grant equitable relief.”358 Finding “no basis under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal law, or the U.S. Constitution for federal courts to apply a freestanding, independent body of
equitable principles to resolve all remedial issues” when enforcing
state-created rights, Morley argued for an absolute rule in diversity
cases that federal courts should always apply state law when deciding whether to provide equitable relief.359 He proposed what he
called a “new vision of the federal equity power: equity follows the
law.”360 Under this “new” vision, federal courts apply homogeneous
equity when enforcing federal rights, and heterogeneous equity
when enforcing state rights.
Morley argued that Guaranty Trust’s preservation of the equitable remedial rights doctrine is inconsistent with Erie, insisting that
Frankfurter’s opinion “required federal courts to apply a uniform
body of equitable principles . . . when deciding whether to grant equitable relief in cases arising under state law.”361 But this overreads
Guaranty Trust. In fact, Guaranty Trust reconciled Erie and the equitable remedial rights doctrine by minimizing the latter: state law
governs whether to grant equitable relief, except in the small minority of cases where equitable relief would not substantially affect the
enforcement of a state-created right.362 The first half of Frankfurter’s
opinion established that Erie applies in equity cases. It held, too, that
Erie preserved a power of federal diversity courts to apply federal
358

Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power 32, 35 (Mar. 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2924107.
359
Id. at 35, 57–61.
360
Id.
361
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
362
See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).

2017]

OUR EQUITY: FEDERALISM AND CHANCERY

229

law when deciding whether to grant equitable relief. But the second
half of the opinion tightly circumscribed that power: it cannot substantially affect the enforcement of the right or significantly affect
the outcome of the litigation. This gutted the equitable remedial
rights doctrine. Equitable doctrines and remedies supplement the
common law, so they often materially affect the litigation. Of
course, “substantially affect the enforcement of the right,”363 and
“significantly affect the result of a litigation,”364 are not the most
precise formulations. Frankfurter offered little guidance, but it is
clear that he put the significant modification of a state remedy in the
same category as a denial of the state remedy.365 Frankfurter, guided
by Erie, stringently limited the equitable remedial rights doctrine.
The very result of Guaranty Trust shows that it depleted federal
equity in diversity cases. Frankfurter held that a federal court sitting
in diversity is bound by a state statute of limitations because the statute “bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely formally
or negligibly”366 and enacts “consequences that so intimately affect
recovery or non-recovery.”367 Before Guaranty Trust, however, federal diversity courts took the traditional equitable approach to state
statutes of limitation. Frankfurter described this approach in a nondiversity case decided a year after Guaranty Trust.368 “Traditionally
363

Id. at 109.
Id.
365
As Frankfurter wrote for the Court in 1947, “[a] federal court in North Carolina, when invoked on grounds of diversity of citizenship, cannot give that which
North Carolina has withheld.” Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192 (1947). See
also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536–37 (1958)
(Guaranty Trust “evinced a broader policy to the effect that the federal courts
should conform as near as may be—in the absence of other considerations—to
state rules even of form and mode where the state rules may bear substantially on
the question whether the litigation would come out one way in the federal court
and another way in the state court if the federal court failed to apply a particular
local rule”).
366
Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 110.
367
Id.
368
See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 393–97 (1946). Creditors had
sued to enforce a liability imposed by federal statute and the Second Circuit, relying on Guaranty Trust, held that the state statute of limitations barred suit on
the federal cause of action. See id. at 393–94. Frankfurter, seemingly exasperated,
explained that in Guaranty Trust “we pointed out with almost wearisome reiteration . . . that we were there concerned solely with State-created rights.” Id. at 394.
Federal courts, when “sitting as national courts throughout the country,” could
364
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and for good reasons,” Frankfurter said, “statutes of limitation are
not controlling measures of equitable relief.”369 The “historic principles of equity” took cognizance of statutes of limitation “solely for
the light they may shed in determining that which is decisive for the
chancellor’s intervention, namely, whether the plaintiff has inexcusably slept on his rights so as to make a decree against the defendant
unfair.”370 Guaranty Trust’s curbing of equity in federal diversity
courts thus entailed the elimination of what Frankfurter called “the
old chancery rule” regarding statutes of limitation, which “this Court
long ago adopted as its own.”371
Subsequent cases verify that Guaranty Trust did not “confirm[]
the vitality of independent federal equity law,” nor did it preserve a
broad equitable remedial rights doctrine.372 The clearest example,
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, was decided in 1956.373
Both Justice Douglas for the Court and Frankfurter writing separately refused to apply the equitable remedial rights doctrine. Defendant had removed, on diversity grounds, a state law employment
contract case to the federal court.374 Defendant moved for a stay to
specifically enforce the arbitration clause.375 But under state law, an

“apply their own principles.” Id. at 395. Interestingly, Frankfurter observed that
“[e]quity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility,” and “will not lend
itself to . . . fraud and historically has relieved from it.” Id. at 396. The equitable
rule that “where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and ‘remains in ignorance of
it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute
does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered’” is “read into every federal
statute of limitation.” Id. at 397 (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342,
348 (1874)).
369
Id. at 396.
370
Id. at 395–96.
371
Id. at 397.
372
Morley, supra note 358, at 32.
373
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Morley
cites Bernhardt for the proposition that “[t]he Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that rights are substantive in the Erie context.” Morley, supra note 358,
at 50. But he does not address the fact that Bernhardt—which followed Guaranty
Trust and refused equitable relief in a federal diversity court because the state
court wouldn’t give it—counts against his argument. See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at
202–05.
374
Id. at 199.
375
Id.
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agreement to arbitrate was revocable prior to an award, and therefore could not be specifically enforced.376 The Second Circuit held
that Erie did not apply, arguing that arbitration was merely another
form of trial.377 Douglas disagreed, applying Guaranty Trust’s holding that a federal diversity court “may not ‘substantially affect the
enforcement of the right as given by the State.’”378 He wrote that
“remedy by arbitration . . . substantially affects the cause of action
created by the State.”379 Frankfurter separately agreed “that the differences between arbitral and judicial determination of a controversy under a contract sufficiently go to the merits of the outcome”
to engage Erie.380 Because the equitable remedy of specific performance “vitally and not merely formally or negligibly” affected enforcement of the state-created right, Guaranty Trust required application of state law.381 Scholarship confirmed the limited scope of the
equitable remedial rights doctrine after Guaranty Trust.382

376

Id. at 199–200.
See id. at 202.
378
Id. at 203 (quoting Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).
379
Id.
380
Id. at 207–08 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The decisions immediately following Guaranty Trust robustly enforced its outcome-determinative test, limiting
the power of federal diversity courts to displace state law. The 1949 trilogy all
applied Guaranty Trust to enforce state law. See generally Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949). Byrd, decided in 1958, and Hanna, decided in 1965 and still the leading
case on Erie, were concerned with limiting Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative analysis. See generally Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S.
525 (1958); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
381
Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. at 110.
382
In 1946, Guaranty Trust was recognized as “limiting the use of the doctrine,” even though it seemed to “preserve[] to the federal courts an independent
determination of the appropriate equitable remedy.” Equitable Remedial Rights
Doctrine, supra note 14, at 414–15. By 1954, the limited scope of the doctrine
had settled. Henry Hart wrote that “[t]he decisions to date permit the conclusion
that a federal court . . . may not grant a remedy which the state court would deny,
even though the state court’s denial would be without prejudice to the underlying
substantive right.” Hart, supra note 356, at 511–12 n.75. See also Past and Present, supra note 14, at 843–44 (“It would seem, therefore, that the federal court in
diversity matters should ordinarily grant the same remedy that would be given in
state court.”).
377
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The rigid narrowness of Guaranty Trust’s equitable remedial
rights doctrine robs Morley’s critique of its sting. Contrary to Morley’s argument, the equitable remedial rights doctrine does not permit federal diversity courts to “apply a uniform set of equitable principles to all cases,”383 nor “establish their own bodies of equitable
principles applicable to all cases,”384 nor “establish a national code
of equitable remedial principles as a matter of substantive law.”385
It is one thing to say that federal diversity courts have no authority
to establish a substantive national code of equity. But it is quite another to deny the authority of a federal diversity court to issue a preliminary injunction under federal law to prevent the frustration of
the federal judicial process.386 In Part V, I argue that, consistently
with Erie, some genuine preliminary injunctions fall within the very
limited operation of the equitable remedial rights doctrine.
IV.

FACILITATIVE EQUITY: A THIRD CONCEPTION OF FEDERAL
EQUITY
Concluding that homogeneous federal equity was inconsistent
with Erie, Frankfurter aggressively enforced Erie in equity cases.
But there was a road not taken. In the early years of the Republic,
before 1809, federal equity courts asserted neither a strong independent power to administer equity solely on their own principles
nor an equity jurisdiction tightly bounded by the states. Instead, federal courts capitalized on the flexibility of equity and its facilitative
nature. Recent work has highlighted modern equity’s strongly facilitative character.387 Of course, equity has long facilitated the convenient or effective enforcement of common law rights.388 The quia
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Morley, supra note 358, at 3.
Id. at 54.
385
Id. at 53.
386
In 1954, Henry Hart posed the question: “Could [a federal district court in
a diversity case] deny a remedy which [state] courts would grant?” He said that
the answer “would seem in principle to be yes, of course—providing the federal
courts merely decline to adjudicate and do not purport to settle substantive rights
inconsistently with applicable state law.” Hart, supra note 356, at 511–512 n.75.
387
P.G. Turner, Equity and Administration, in EQUITY AND ADMINISTRATION,
supra note 29, at 2–3.
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See HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at 11–12.
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timet injunction, interpleader, and discovery are only three examples; they demonstrate the importance of the equitable function in
aiding the enforcement of legal rights.389
This Part will outline three ways in which early federal courts
deployed equity to facilitate the practical functioning of the nascent
federal judiciary, taking care not to encroach on state interests and
activities. First, in one of its earliest decisions, the Supreme Court
issued an injunction to stay execution of a circuit court judgment at
law, solely to allow a state to pursue its legal rights in federal
court.390 Second, a circuit court refused to exercise diversity jurisdiction after an equitable bill of discovery revealed that diversity
among the parties had been fraudulently manufactured.391 Third,
federal equity courts deferred to a state’s interpretation of its own
statute, even if they thought the interpretation wrong.392 After 1809,
as federal court procedure became more settled and the Supreme
Court consolidated its judicial power—including the previously unnoticed talk in Bodley and Brown about federal courts exercising
equity jurisdiction on their own principles—federal equity transitioned from a subservient facilitative conception to the more robust
homogeneous conception.
After explaining the legal doctrine,393 this Part situates facilitative federal equity in its historical context.394 Just as homogeneous
federal equity served the goals of a country bent on westward continental expansion, and heterogeneity served Frankfurter’s progressive politics, so facilitative federal equity was deployed for a larger
purpose. The federal courts’ facilitative equity—especially the traditional facilitative jurisdiction in aid of legal rights—played an important administrative and nation-building role in an era where the
states were the powerful stakeholders in the young federalism. It is

389
See, e.g., Buskirk v. King, 72 F. 22, 25 (4th Cir. 1896); Sanders v. Armour
Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 200 (1934); Ex parte Boyd, 105 U.S. 647, 657–
58 (1881).
390
See generally Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 404–405 (1792); Brailsford
II, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 418–19 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
391
See generally Maxfield’s Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330, 332–33,
335, 16 F. Cas. 1195 (C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No. 9,321).
392
See, e.g., Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 415, 419–20 (1808).
393
See infra Part IV.A.
394
See infra Part IV.B.
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true that even during the era of facilitative equity, federal courts exercised chancery jurisdiction on their own principles. But it was not
a conscious assertion of non-statutory jurisdiction, as Marshall
claimed in Bodley and Brown in 1809. Facilitative federal equity is,
in short, functionally different from homogeneous federal equity.
Before 1809, federal equity was not purposed to secure uniformity
over an ever-increasing territorial expanse. Rather, the federal courts
actively used equity jurisdiction to practically administer the Judiciary Act of 1789 and to secure the footing of the federal judiciary in
the new constitutional landscape.
A.

The Doctrine

1. PRESERVING THE STATES’ LEGAL CLAIMS
In Georgia v. Brailsford, decided in August 1792, federal equity
facilitated the enforcement of a state statute in a federal trial court.395
The case is significant not only because it “offered the Justices the
opportunity to explore for the first time the relation between the law
and equity sides of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.”396 It also
showed that Georgia, one of the sovereign components of the nascent federalism, could rely on the Supreme Court’s equity side to
assist in the enforcement (in federal court) of its own legal rights
created by its statutes.
The common law side of the federal Circuit Court for the District
of Georgia had issued judgment on a 1774 bond.397 Georgia’s application to be added as a party in the circuit court, on the basis that the
debt was subject to the state’s confiscation act, was denied.398 It was
not an isolated case. In one of its filings, Georgia claimed that in
many cases the circuit court had issued judgment “for debts within
the descriptions of the confiscation law, upon the sole principle of

395

See generally Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 404–05 (1792).
Maeva Marcus, Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 57, 57 (1996).
397
Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 404.
398
See John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the History of
American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1443–45 (1998) (observing that Georgia’s attempted interpleader failed because defendant objected to the interpleader
and because the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over cases where a state
was a party).
396
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debtor and creditor, and without any reference to the right and claim
of the state.”399
Possessed of a claimed legal right without a legal remedy in the
federal courts, Georgia commenced proceedings on the equity side
of the Supreme Court. The bill prayed for an injunction to stay in
the hands of the marshal of the circuit court the property levied and
money raised in execution of the judgment.400 It also requested that
the Court direct the marshal to pay money raised in execution of
judgment, and the defendant at law to pay the balance, to the treasurer of Georgia—in other words, Georgia asked the equity side of
the Supreme Court for a decision on the merits of Georgia’s common law claim.401 Over two dissents, and a subsequent dissolution
motion, the Supreme Court granted the injunction because “the
money ought to be kept for the party to whom it belongs.”402 The
equity side of the Supreme Court did not decide the merits of the
claim. Rather, the Court, to enable Georgia to pursue its legal right
to the debt, held that “the money should remain in the custody of the
law, till the law has adjudged to whom it belongs.”403 Twelve
months later, when common law proceedings had finished and a jury
had determined that Georgia was not entitled to the money,404 the
injunction was, naturally, dissolved.405
Two aspects of the case will be elaborated later.406 First, the justices resorted to general equitable principles derived from the English High Court of Chancery. Second, equity was deployed to support the federal system that was “so new and in many respects unaided by [an]y former examples.”407 Georgia turned to federal equity
to fashion a remedy to vindicate its legal rights in the federal courts.
399

Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 404 (quoting Georgia’s pleading).
Id. at 404–05.
401
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Brailsford II, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 418–19 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
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Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
404
See Georgia v. Brailsford (Brailsford III), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 5 (1794).
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Brailsford II, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419 n.*; Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at
409 n.*.
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See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
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Letter from James Iredell to George Washington (Feb. 23, 1792), in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT 1790–1794, at 239, 240 (Maeva Marcus ed.,
1988) [hereinafter James Iredell to George Washington].
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2. LIMITING FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
The second circumstance where the early federal courts used equity to legitimize their processes was the prevention of the fraudulent manufacture of diversity jurisdiction. In Maxfield’s Lessee v.
Levy,408 the plaintiff, a Delaware citizen, had brought seventy ejectment actions in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania.409
The defendants filed a bill for discovery on the equity side of the
federal court.410 The discovery (which was competent evidence in
the common law ejectment proceedings) disclosed that the land, located in Pennsylvania, had been conveyed to the plaintiff for no consideration by a Pennsylvania citizen, for the sole purpose of making
the plaintiff the nominal lessor to ground diversity jurisdiction.411
Riding circuit, Justice Iredell dismissed all seventy ejectment
suits in an opinion he thought “very important,”412 because “it concerns the constitution and laws of the United States, in a point highly
essential to their welfare, to wit, the proper boundaries between the
authority of a single state, and that of the United States.”413 Iredell
was not happy at the prospect of the circuit court’s diversity jurisdiction being fraudulently manufactured. A party, he said, “must assign a good reason for coming here.”414 With these federalism concerns front-and-center, Iredell fumed that “[t]here is not the least
shadow of evidence” that the land had been conveyed in good
faith.415 He thundered:
When the constitution has guarded, with the utmost
solicitude, against the exercise of a particular authority, so as that, under certain circumstances, one man
408

See Maxfield’s Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330, 16 F. Cas. 1195
(C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No. 9,321).
409
Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (Apr. 21, 1797), in 3 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–
1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT 1795–1800, at 170, 170 n.1 (Maeva Marcus ed.,
1990) [hereinafter James Iredell to Hannah Iredell].
410
See Maxfield, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 330.
411
See id. at 331–35; James Iredell to Hannah Iredell, supra note 409, at 170
n.1.
412
James Iredell to Hannah Iredell, supra note 409, at 170.
413
Maxfield, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 330.
414
Id. at 332.
415
Id. at 333.
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shall not sue another in a Court created under it, can
such a Court for a moment support a doctrine, that it
shall be in the power of such a man, by any contrivance expressly calculated to defeat this object, to
render it wholly nugatory? This, indeed, would be to
render the laws of our country a farce; to make the
constitution a mere shadow; and deservedly to draw
upon those entrusted with its execution, an odium
which has been industriously, but, I hope, will ever
be in vain attempted.416
Iredell therefore dismissed the suits because the plaintiff “only permits his name to be used, for the support of a fraud on the jurisdiction of the Court.”417 Although acknowledging that he could not
award costs, Iredell added for good measure that if it was in his
power, he would have ordered double costs.418
As elaborated below, Iredell used equity to guard federal jurisdiction.419 If the court only had the ejectment pleadings, without the
benefit of the bill of discovery, then that “would leave the constitution, and the law . . . open to certain evasion.”420 Here, “the aid of
equity” ensured “that the Court be not made . . . an usurper of jurisdiction not belonging to it.”421 Iredell made the case about the federal structure, denying relief to preserve “the proper boundaries between the authority of a single state, and that of the United
States.”422 And even if judgment had been entered by the common
law court, “equity might properly grant an injunction, to prevent a
party availing himself of his own fraud.”423

416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423

Id.
Id. at 334–35.
See id. at 338.
See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
Maxfield, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 336.
Id.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 336.
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3. FOLLOWING STATE LAW
a.
State Statutes
Although the Rules of Decision Act did not apply to equity suits,
early federal courts sitting in equity carefully applied state statutes.
For example, as discussed above, in 1792 the equity side of the Supreme Court—in the absence of a writ of error and at the application
of a state (a third party)—restrained a federal court from executing
a judgment at law when that state’s statute had not been applied.424
In 1805, the equity side of the Supreme Court adopted “the construction given by the courts of Georgia to the statute.”425 The equity side
of the lower federal courts also diligently enforced state statutes according to their terms.426 Even when the equity side of a federal
court did not apply a state statute, the court seemed to base its conclusion on a faithful interpretation of the statutory language rather
than the application of freestanding equitable doctrine.427
One variety of state statute is of particular interest. The early
federal courts uniformly applied state statutes of limitations. This
may have been established as early as 1806 in Hopkirk v. Bell.428
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that Virginia’s act of limitations was no bar, but only because the statute was nullified by the
Treaty of Paris.429 But for the interposition of the treaty, the state
statute of limitations would have barred plaintiff’s federal equity

424

See supra Part IV.A.1.
Telfair v. Stead’s Ex’rs, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 407, 418 (1805) (“We have received information as to the construction given by the courts of Georgia to the
statute of 5 Geo. 2 making lands in the colonies liable for debts, and are satisfied
that they are considered as chargeable without making the heir a party.”).
426
See, e.g., Thompson v. Jamesson, 23 F. Cas. 1051, 1052 (C.C.D.C. 1806)
(No. 13,960) (applying the statute of frauds) (“A court of equity cannot, more than
a court of law, dispense with the positive and clear prohibition of a statute.”).
427
See, e.g., Ray v. Law, 20 F. Cas. 329, 330 (C.C.D.C. 1806) (No. 11,591)
(“THE COURT, on considering the acts of Maryland on that subject, were of opinion that they did not apply to the court of chancery.”).
428
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454, 456–58 (1806).
429
Id. at 458.
425

2017]

OUR EQUITY: FEDERALISM AND CHANCERY

239

suit.430 In general, the circuit courts followed state statutes of limitations.431 And in at least one equity case, the Supreme Court
adopted the state court interpretation of its limitation statute, even
though the Court thought that the interpretation was contrary to the
text.432 It was a different story once the notion of homogeneous federal equity took root. Some federal equity courts considered state
statutes of limitation binding;433 other federal courts thought the
statutes relevant to the equitable doctrine of laches;434 still others
held that they were free from the statute altogether.435 It was this
precise controversy that kicked off Guaranty Trust.
b.
When State Common Law Courts “Equitise”
Before 1809, the federal courts vigilantly applied the Rules of
Decision Act even if it meant changing the boundary between law
and equity in federal court. A line of cases from Pennsylvania confronted the “strange mixture of legal and equitable powers, in the
Courts of law of this state,” which “arises from the want of a distinct
forum to exercise chancery jurisdiction; and, therefore, the common
430

The Circuit Court for the District of Virginia, sitting in equity, certified to
the Supreme Court the question “[w]hether the act of assembly of Virginia for the
limitation of actions pleaded by the defendant was, under all the circumstances
stated, a bar to the plaintiff’s demand founded on a promissory note given on the
21st day of August, 1773?” Id. at 454. The Virginia limitations period for equity
suits seeking an account was five years from the date the cause of action accrued.
Id. at 456. Payees were British subjects and the Treaty of Paris provided “that
creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of
the full value, in sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.” Id.
at 455. The Court held that the plaintiff’s demand on the note was not barred by
the statute of limitations. “[T]he length of time from the giving the note to the
commencement of the war” was “not . . . sufficient to bar the demand on the said
note, according to the said act of assembly” because “the treaty . . . does not admit
of adding the time previous to the war, to any time subsequent to the treaty, in
order to make a bar.” Id. at 458. In other words, the Treaty of Paris removed the
“lawful impediment”—the statute of limitations. Id. at 455.
431
See GOEBEL, supra note 91, at 588 n.167.
432
Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 415, 419–20 (1808).
433
See, e.g., Pulliam v. Pulliam, 10 F. 53, 76–78 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1881).
434
See, e.g., Alsop v. Riker, 155 U.S. 448, 460–61 (1894); see also Halstead
v. Grinnan, 152 U.S. 412, 416–17 (1894); Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.)
503, 560–61 (1846).
435
See, e.g., Johnston v. Roe, 1 F. 692, 695 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1880); Kirby v.
Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co., 120 U.S. 130, 137–38 (1887).
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law Courts equitise as far as possible.”436 The federal courts—rather
than assert that the distinction between law and equity in federal
court could not be altered by the states (as was customary after
1809)—deferred and sat as mirror images of the state common law
courts, “equitis[ing] as far as possible.”437
In 1799, the Supreme Court followed Pennsylvania’s classification of legal and equitable rights to land. In Sims’ Lessee v. Irvine,
the Court’s paramount concern was adherence to local law for fear
of upsetting land titles.438 Plaintiff grounded his ejectment on money
paid, a warrant, and a survey, but no patent.439 Ordinarily, this vested
only equitable title to land and was therefore insufficient for a common law ejectment suit.440 But in Pennsylvania, “whether from a
defect of Chancery powers, or for other reasons of policy or justice,”
it vested legal title.441 Invoking the Rules of Decision Act, Chief
Justice Ellsworth held that the “established legal right . . . with property and tenures . . . remains a legal right notwithstanding any new
distribution of judicial powers.”442 Iredell concurred because the
rule, “having been the ground of many titles, it would be improper
in the Court to shake it.”443 But he took the opportunity to issue a
paean to the law/equity distinction, and he cautioned federal judges
against deviating from “legal strictness” “when the want of a Court
of equity may urge them to procure substantial justice.”444
Similarly, deciding an ejectment suit while riding circuit in
1806, Justice Washington administered equity through the common

436

Hollingsworth v. Fry, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 345, 348, 12 F. Cas. 378 (C.C.D. Pa.
1800) (No. 6,619).
437
Id.
438
Sims’ Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425, 456–57 (1799).
439
Id.
440
Id.
441
Id. at 457.
442
Id.
443
Id. at 465 (Iredell, J., concurring).
444
Id. See also Penn’s Lessee v. Klyne, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 402, 410, 19 F. Cas.
161 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 10,935) (adopting principle of Sims but holding that defendant had merely an equitable title, even under
an expanded definition of the legal title in Pennsylvania); Willis v. Bucher, 30 F.
Cas. 63, 66 (Washington, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 17,769) (Sims
“has been always regarded and acted upon in this court”).
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law exactly like a Pennsylvania court.445 In his charge to the jury,
Washington observed that defendant “must show a better title, either
legal or equitable,” and—in case anyone missed it— “[w]hen I say
equitable, I speak in reference to the laws and usages of this
state.”446 Any equitable title “must be such as a court of equity
would sustain.”447 Washington then applied “[t]he rule in this state
. . . that if a man, having a warrant, do not use due diligence to survey it, so as to afford notice to others, he loses his priority.”448 Citing
Fonblanque’s equity treatise, the justice asked: “[w]hat kind of figure would this defendant make in a court of equity, with his dormant
title, against a fair bona fide purchaser, without notice, and shielded
by a legal title?”449
By 1811—notably, after Bodley and Brown—Washington had
changed course, or at least applied a different rule when land titles
were not at issue. Riding circuit in Jordan v. Wilkins, he refused to
adopt the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s conscious equitable liberalization of the common law action of account.450 The plaintiff
brought an action at law against one of his partners alleging that the
defendant withheld money received from named third parties that
belonged to the plaintiff.451 The evidence, however, showed that the
defendant received the money from a third party whom the plaintiff
had not named.452 This would usually justify dismissal because the
common law required that the defendant receive money only from
the third parties named in the pleadings.453 But in 1788, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relaxed that requirement, observing that
“we have no Court of Chancery to interpose an equitable jurisdiction.”454 Washington would have none of it. The state court’s expansion of the action of account was “in consequence of the want of
445

See Gordon v. Kerr, 10 F. Cas. 801, 802 (Washington, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 5,611).
446
Id.
447
Id. at 802–03.
448
Id. at 803.
449
Id.
450
Jordan v. Wilkins, 13 F. Cas. 1112, 1112 (Washington, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 7,526).
451
Id.
452
Id.
453
Id.
454
James v. Browne, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 339, 339, 1 Ald. 98 (Pa. 1788).
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chancery jurisdiction in the state.”455 But “[t]his court has chancery
jurisdiction.”456 The action was dismissed.457
It appears, however, that on evidentiary issues not affecting land
title, federal judges at common law disregarded the “strange mixture
of legal and equitable powers” in the Pennsylvania courts—even if
it meant divergent outcomes.458 In O’Harra v. Hall, the assignor of
a bond objected at trial to the assignee’s attempt to offer parol evidence showing that the assignor had guaranteed payment of the
bond.459 The assignee had invoked the equitable principle allowing
parol evidence to prove misrepresentation, and cited a Pennsylvania
Supreme Court case holding that “parol evidence was proper to be
admitted” in a common law action for ejectment to show “a breach
of trust.”460 The federal court was unmoved. The district judge observed that the result would have been different had plaintiff brought
the action in state court:
If we were sitting as Judges in a state Court, I should
be inclined to admit the testimony, in order to attain
the real justice of the cause; as there is no Court of
equity in Pennsylvania. But there is no such defect in
the federal jurisdiction; and, therefore, when the
party comes to the common law side of the Court, he
must be content with the strict common law rule of
evidence.461
Justice Chase, riding circuit, agreed. He said that although “chancery will not confine itself to the strict rule . . . we are sitting as
Judges at common-law.”462

455

Jordan, 13 F. Cas. at 1112.
Id.
457
Id.
458
Hollingsworth v. Fry, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 345, 348, 12 F. Cas. 378 (Paterson,
Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 6,619).
459
O’Harra v. Hall, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 340, 340–41, 18 F. Cas. 628 (C.C.D. Pa.
1800) (No. 10,468).
460
Lessee of Thompson v. White, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 424, 428, 1 Ald. 128 (Pa.
1789). Thompson was cited by Jared Ingersoll for the plaintiff assignee. O’Harra,
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 340.
461
O’Harra, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 341.
462
Id. (Chase, Circuit Justice).
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The equity side of the Pennsylvania federal court, although not
bound by the express terms of the Rules of Decision Act, similarly
took notice of state merger. Riding circuit in 1800, Justice Paterson
effectively held that a failure to put equitable arguments to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had waived those arguments on the equity
side of the federal court.463 Plaintiff’s failure, in the earlier state
court action, to apprise that court of the equity of its case contributed
to Paterson’s dismissal, for laches, of the bill filed in federal court.464
Hollingsworth centered on an agreement executed in 1790 providing that if, by a date certain in 1791, plaintiff had not paid defendant
money to which defendant was entitled by reason of improvements
to land, then the defendant would hold the land free from plaintiff’s
claims. 465 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania gave judgment in
July 1791 for defendant.466 Years later, plaintiff filed a bill on the
equity side of federal court, alleging fraud by defendant and requesting a perpetual injunction against all proceedings on the state court
judgment.467
Interestingly, Paterson did not refer to the delicate issue of plaintiff’s request for a federal injunction arresting a state common law
judgment. Instead he dismissed the bill for laches.468 Time was of
the essence in the 1790 contract, and even if it were not, plaintiff
“comes too late to avail himself . . . . The door of equity cannot remain open for ever.”469 Paterson observed that “[t]here is a strange
mixture of legal and equitable powers, in the Courts of law of this
state,” which “arises from the want of a distinct forum to exercise
chancery jurisdiction; and, therefore, the common law Courts equitise as far as possible.”470 It was unnecessary to determine whether
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would have extended relief to
the plaintiff, because plaintiff should “have laid the equity of the
case before the judges of that Court” when he was on notice of entry
of judgment. 471 Plaintiff “did not avail himself of an appeal to the
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471

Hollingsworth, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 348.
Id. at 347–48.
Id. at 345–46.
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 348.
Id.
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discretion of the Court; but suffered judgment to pass against him,
without making any objection.”472
B.
The Motivation
Just as homogeneous federal equity served to maintain the institutional coherence of the federal courts during westward continental
expansion, and heterogeneous federal equity served to consolidate
Progressive values in the aftermath of the New Deal, the facilitative
conception of federal equity served larger goals. Equity functioned
as a useful tool to administer the Judiciary Act of 1789, and it contributed to the construction of the early American state.
1. EQUITY AND ADMINISTRATION
Recent scholarship illustrates that equity’s facilitative character
explains its capacity for performing administrative tasks.473 Taking
a wide view of administration, Turner notes a variety of administrative tasks, “from the administration of the assets of trusts, through
the administration of insolvent estates and of solvent and insolvent
business associations, and to the administration of the affairs of the
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.”474 Equity administers a legislative scheme, for example, by “keep[ing] a
responsible person to the performance of his or her obligations under
the scheme.”475 And, when the common law or statute runs out, equity can provide a lawful foundation for administrative tasks.476 In
enforcing a trust, “equity gives effect to deliberately established regimes for the management of assets” when common law and statute
do not.477 Sometimes these features (administering a legislative
scheme and providing a lawful foundation for administrative tasks)
472

Id.
See generally, e.g., P.G. Turner, Equity and Administration, in EQUITY
AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 29, at 2–3, 33. It is unconventional, perhaps
even heretical, to describe any Article III activity as administration rather than
adjudication. I do not mean to argue that Article III courts perform non-judicial
administrative functions when they exercise equity jurisdiction. The point, rather,
is that some exercises of judicial power by equity courts can be broadly characterized as administrative.
474
Id. at 2–3.
475
Id. at 3.
476
See id. at 2–3, 19.
477
Id. at 19.
473
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combine. Equity’s imposition of fiduciary obligations on company
directors arose as an aspect of the administration of early corporations legislation.478 Courts of equity provided a lawful basis to impose fiduciary obligations on company directors “by reason of the
similarity between their position of control over the company and
its assets and the positions held by trustees and agents.”479
The early federal courts enlisted equity to administer the first
Judiciary Act. The statute was an ex ante mode of regulation; and it
is, of course, impossible to specify in advance the infinite variety of
opportunistic behavior that will exploit statutory loopholes.480 Equity’s ex post perspective was necessary to ensure that the legislative
scheme worked in a commonsense way. In Brailsford, for example,
the strict application of the common law prevented Georgia from
interpleading in the circuit court to press its legal claim.481 On the
equity side of the Supreme Court, Georgia alleged that the parties
had conspired not to appeal, thereby frustrating Georgia’s claim482
(until 1875 the lower federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear suits
brought by States).483 Equity provided a lawful foundation to halt
execution of judgment so that Georgia’s legal entitlement to the debt
could be finally decided. The injunction thwarted an untenable situation where a state could not enforce its statute in federal court. Similarly, in Maxfield, equity neutralized the opportunistic manufacture
of diversity jurisdiction.484 It enforced the statutory policy that federal court jurisdiction is limited and should not be guilefully enlarged.
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Matthew Conaglen, Equity’s Role, in EQUITY AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 29, at 504.
479
Id.
480
See generally Smith, supra note 55, at 175–76, 180–81, 184.
481
James Iredell to George Washington, supra note 407, at 241–42.
482
Brailsford I, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 404 (1792) (Georgia alleged that “defendant had confederated with [plaintiffs].”).
483
See Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 851, 868–69 n.89 (2016).
484
Maxfield’s Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330, 331–36, 16 F. Cas. 1195
(Iredell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1797) (No. 9,321).
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2. NATION BUILDING
In his seminal work on the construction of American statehood,
Stephen Skowronek recounted that in the eyes of Tocqueville, Hegel, and Marx, the nineteenth-century U.S. governmental order
“failed to evoke the sense of a state.”485 This “distinctive sense of
statelessness” was generated by the location of substantive government in the several states.486 The federal government was comparatively weak and it assumed the absence of strong national institutions.487 The federal institutions that penetrated the territory were
“land offices, post offices, and customhouses,” “illustrat[ing] the
orientation toward basic services that routinely dominated federal
concerns.”488 The majority of law, too, was state-centric: “[o]ne
finds the most fundamental social choices—from the organization
of capitalism to the regulation of family life—firmly lodged in state
legal codes.”489
The diffusion of governmental power across far-flung territory
posed obvious problems for the early federal nation, which Skowronek argues were solved by “the cohesive procedures of courts and
parties.”490 The federal courts in the nineteenth century made sense
of the untested constitutional order, and the Supreme Court emerged
in the 1790s as an important player in the resolution of federal-state
disputes.491 Plainly the fallout from Chisholm v. Georgia492 looms
large, and the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment as a “stunning
rebuke to Jay and the Court” has dominated scholarly attention.493
In holding that the Constitution stripped state sovereign immunity
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SKOWRONEK, supra note 28, at 8.
Id. at 23.
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Id.
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See JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT AS FINAL ARBITER IN
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS: 1789–1957, at 24 (1958) (“[A]n examination of the
record of the judiciary in the period from 1790 to 1800 reveals an imposing record
of decisive action as arbiter in federal-state relations.”).
492
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE,
1789–2008, at 27–28 (2009).
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from suit in federal court, Chisholm played into antifederalist fears
and positioned the states in opposition to the federal government.494
a.
Preserving the States’ Legal Claims
Chisholm describes a conflict model of federal-state relations,
and the Supreme Court’s interjection was a roaring failure. By contrast, in Brailsford, the Supreme Court deployed the flexibility of
equity to enable the state to vindicate its legal rights in federal court.
In an era when the procedure of the Supreme Court had not been
liquidated through practice, equity proved a vital tool to maintain
institutional coherence.495 In February 1792, before the case was argued in the Supreme Court, Justice Iredell wrote President Washington that Georgia’s inability to press its claim in the circuit court
constituted a “circumstance of great importance” and “of the highest
moment,” arising “under a system without precedent in the history
of Mankind.”496 And it is hard to imagine the federal judiciary—
with “only a few judges, fledgling courts (some of which lacked regular judges altogether), and precious little else”—maintaining (let
alone consolidating) authority if the states could not sue there on
their own statutes.497
The statute at issue, Georgia’s sequestration statute, was particularly contested.498 The Treaty of Paris required payment of prewar
debts to British creditors, but recovery in state court was difficult
494

See generally Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789–1800: ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:
LEGISLATION AND COMMENTARIES 176 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) [hereinafter 4
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. In the early 1790s even Congress treaded lightly,
“reflect[ing] the general feeling, expressed in a number of letters between members of Congress and their correspondents, that the system was as yet too untried
to warrant radical reform.” Id.
496
James Iredell to George Washington, supra note 407, at 241–42. See also
6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CASES 1790–1795, at 85 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998) (“[T]he case attracted much
public attention . . .”); Nathaniel Pendleton’s Circuit Court Opinion (May 2,
1792), reprinted in id. at 92 (referring to the case as “a cause of great expectation”); Brailsford III, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 3 (1794) (“This cause has been regarded
as of great importance; and doubtless it is so.”).
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Daniel J. Meltzer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 423,
427 (1989).
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due to the proliferation of confiscation and sequestration statutes.499
It is hardly surprising that the Augusta Chronicle expressly
acknowledged that the injunction issued by the Supreme Court
strengthened the institutional integrity of the federal courts and the
stability of the federal government itself:
It must be acknowledged that this decision reflects
great honor on the four [sic three] Judges who accorded therein. It not only wears a republican feature,
as maintaining the legal rights of individual states,
but must tend to the stability of the general government itself from its impartial tenor.500
It is noteworthy too that Jefferson used the “integrity” of the circuit
court opinion in Brailsford (refusing to let Georgia interplead) to
counter British allegations that the United States had violated the
Treaty of Paris.501
The Supreme Court’s equity side showed how flexible the federal judiciary could be. The Court went to surprising lengths to hear
Georgia’s legal claim in Brailsford. First, the very fact that the injunction was granted demonstrates awareness of the English doctrine permitting courts of equity to stay money in the hands of the
sheriff even after execution of a judgment at law.502 This species of
injunction was relatively novel, originating under Lord Thurlow.503
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See Lochlan F. Shelfer, Note, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123
YALE L.J. 208, 221 (2013).
500
AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Mar. 16, 1793, reprinted in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CASES 1790–1795, supra note 496 at 147.
501
See Continuation of Mr. Jefferson’s Letter to Mr. Hammond, DAILY
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See ROBERT HENLEY EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 44
(London, Joseph Butterworth & Son 1821) (“Injunctions to stay proceedings at
law, are granted . . . if execution has taken place, to stay the money in the hands
of the Sheriff . . . .”); SAMUEL TURNER, THE PRESENT PRACTICE AND COSTS IN
THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 961–62 (London, J & W.T. Clarke, 6th ed. 1825)
(same); JOHN COLLYER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP
478 (London, S. Sweet 1832); Hawkshaw v. Parkins (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 723,
726 (Ch).
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See EDEN, supra note 502, at 72–74; Axe v. Clarke (1779) 21 Eng. Rep.
383, 383–84 (Ch); Franklyn v. Thomas (1817) 36 Eng. Rep. 86, 88–89 (Ch). Thur-
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Second, once the injunction to stay execution issued, the Court had
a choice: it could assert equitable jurisdiction over the entire cause
to decide the substantive merits of Georgia’s claim, or it could relinquish substantive jurisdiction to the common law side for a merits
decision. Importantly, if the Court had opted to retain its equitable
jurisdiction, that would not have precluded a jury trial. The Court’s
equity side could direct an issue to be tried by a jury at common law;
traditionally, however, the Chancellor was not bound by trials or
opinions on issues he had remitted to common law.504 In dissent,
Justices Iredell and Blair favored this approach.505 The Court instead
opted to relinquish its equitable jurisdiction over the substance of
Georgia’s claim.506 Georgia then filed an action on the common law
side of the Supreme Court, and a jury was convened for a final decision.507 In the end, the jury found against Georgia;508 but the Court
had mobilized equity to preserve Georgia’s right to have its legal
claims adjudicated at law by an authoritative, final, and binding jury
verdict. The Court “signaled its desire both to limit the equity jurisdiction of the Court and to have the substantive question tried by a
jury,” and “it appears to have been of great importance to the Court
at this early moment in its history to begin to define the boundaries
between its law and equity jurisdictions in accordance with the language of the Judiciary Act of 1789.”509 Equity’s flexibility facilitated the conclusive determination of Georgia’s legal rights in federal court.
Scholars have focused on the Brailsford Court’s impaneling of
a jury and Jay’s apparently odd instruction that the jury should make
findings of law (the facts were stipulated).510 Riding circuit in 1851,
low was Lord Chancellor 1778–1783 and 1783–1792, and contributed to the systemization of equity in the eighteenth century. HEYDON ET AL., supra note 16, at
9.
504
See Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery, supra note
164, at 1625–28.
505
Brailsford II, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 415–17 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.);
id. at 417–18 (opinion of Blair, J.).
506
Id. at 418–19 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
507
See Brailsford III, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 1 (1794).
508
Id. at 5.
509
6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CASES 1790–1795, supra note 496, at 84 n.65.
510
See Shelfer, supra note 499, at 224–25, 227.
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Justice Curtis said that “the whole case is an anomaly,” because “[i]t
purports to be a trial by jury in the supreme court of the United
States, of certain issues out of chancery,” and “the chief justice begins by telling the jury that the facts are all agreed, and the only
question is a matter of law, and upon that the whole court were
agreed.”511 Recent work suggests that Curtis’s confusion arises from
the nature of the jury impaneled: a special jury of merchants having
power to decide mercantile custom, which was incorporated into the
common law.512 Focusing on the equity side in Brailsford points up
another source of Curtis’s confusion. The case was not “a trial by
jury . . . of certain issues out of chancery.”513 The issues were not
directed out of the Court’s equity side; the Court refused to assume
equitable jurisdiction over Georgia’s substantive claim.514 The merits of that claim were decided in an independent common law action
on the case, the law decided by a special jury of merchants.
b.
Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction
Despite characterizing the early American state as one of courts
and parties, Skowronek nevertheless maintained that the early federal courts “imparted an evanescent or elusive quality” that reinforced an impression of statelessness.515 Circuit riding, so arduous
and expensive for the justices, was intended to “meet every Citizen
in his own State,” and to “carry Law to their Homes, Courts to their
Doors.”516 In widely published grand jury charges, the justices introduced the citizenry to the political principles of the new country,
including those of the national judicial power.517 At the same time,
511

United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1334 (Curtis, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815).
512
See Shelfer, supra note 499, at 224–25, 227. But cf. Daniel Hulsebosch,
Magna Carta for the World? The Merchants’ Chapter and Foreign Capital in the
Early American Republic, 94 N.C.L. REV. 1599, 1623–24 n.97 (2016).
513
Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1334.
514
See Brailsford II, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 418–19 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
515
SKOWRONEK, supra note 28, at 29.
516
William Patterson’s Notes for Remarks on Judiciary Bill (June 23, 1789),
in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 495, at 416; see also 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 495, at 28.
517
See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT 1790–1794, supra note
407, at 5.
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the federal courts were the junior partner in the administration of
justice at the turn of the nineteenth century. The first Judiciary Act
“created circuit courts but no circuit judges”: the designated Supreme Court justice rode into town and soon rode out, leaving perhaps an evanescent or elusive impression.518 Most law was ensconced in the states and enforced by state courts.519 In trials at common law, the Rules of Decision Act directed federal court judges to
apply state law; it was not until 1875 that the federal courts obtained
general federal question jurisdiction.520
Armed with national judicial power but weak institutional apparatus, the federal courts were careful not to overreach. There was,
additionally, the constant antifederalist worry that the federal courts
“would eventually swallow up the State courts.”521 The combination
of these institutional and political constraints weighed on the early
federal judges. Even Justice Iredell, a vocal federalist, simply could
not countenance the artificial manufacture of diversity jurisdiction
in Maxfield.522 Federal court jurisdiction had to be affirmatively established; Iredell used equity to pierce the common law pleadings
518

William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON
CIRCUIT 1790–1794, supra note 407, at xxv.
519
See SKOWRONEK, supra note 28, at 23.
520

See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789); Henry Paul
Monaghan, A Cause of Action, Anyone?: Federal Equity and the Preemption of
State Law, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1807, 1825 n.122 [hereinafter Monaghan, A
Cause of Action, Anyone?]; James J. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 640 (1942).
521
JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE
POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 33 (2012) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 852 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)); G. Edward White, Recovering Coterminous Power Theory: The Lost Dimension of Marshall Court Sovereignty
Cases, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT
OF 1789, at 66, 73 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) (citing Luther Martin’s Information
to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland (Mar. 30, 1788), reprinted in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST: OBJECTIONS OF NON-SIGNERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND MAJOR SERIES OF ESSAYS AT THE OUTSET, supra note 134, at
27, 57).
522
Maxfield’s Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330, 331–33, 16 F. Cas. 1195
(Iredell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Pa. 1977) (No. 9,321). Although Iredell was a
federalist, Goebel detected in at least one of his opinions a “continuing interest in
maintaining watch and ward over the rights of the states.” GOEBEL, supra note 91,
at 753.
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and reach the substance of the basis of federal jurisdiction. This he
did explicitly in service of federalism, to preserve “the proper
boundaries between the authority of a single state, and that of the
United States.”523 Iredell thought that his opinion was “very important,”524 and he asked Dallas to report it in full.525
Nearly forty years later, Justice Story blasted Maxfield as
wrongly animated by “an extreme jealousy of the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States, and an extreme solicitude not to interfere
with the state jurisdiction.”526 John Sergeant, a prominent Supreme
Court advocate in the first half of the nineteenth century, argued the
same point to the Court in the late 1840s:
The case occurred, it will be remembered, as early as
the year 1797, when the Constitution had been very
recently made, its institutions were new and untried,
and they were both regarded with jealousy, as likely
to encroach upon and swallow up the States. The judiciary, of course, had its full share of the effects of
this feeling. Experience has shown that it was
groundless. 527
The point is not to argue that Maxfield was right or wrong. The
point is that Iredell used equity to police the boundaries of federal
jurisdiction. Keeping the early federal courts within their limited jurisdiction was crucial to the perceived legitimacy of their decisions;
and the continuity of the early American state depended on that perceived legitimacy.

523

Id. at 330.
James Iredell to Hannah Iredell, supra note 409, at 170.
525
Maxfield, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 330 n.1.
526
Briggs v. French, 4 F. Cas. 117, 119 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass.
1835) (No. 1,871).
527
Smith v. Kernochen, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 198, 210 (1849). Sergeant was “considered one of the three foremost Supreme Court advocates of the antebellum era,
along with Henry Clay and Daniel Webster.” Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional
Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1880 n.218 (2007). Sergeant was admitted
to the bar in 1799, two years after Maxfield was decided. The Late Honorable
John Sergeant, of Philadelphia, 1 AM. L. REG. 193, 194 (1853).
524
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c.
Following State Law
The practice of early federal courts carefully following state law
enhanced the national judiciary’s institutional coherence and legitimacy. Skowronek observed that “the most fundamental social
choices” were “firmly lodged in state legal codes.”528 The relatively
miniscule volume of federal laws was “interstitial in its nature,” enacted “against the background of the total corpus juris of the
states.”529 State law was therefore necessary for the federal courts’
institutional coherence. This was no less true for the equity side of
the federal courts: equity must take cognizance of the law—including state legislation pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act530—in order to supplement it. At least before 1809, the federal courts’ vigilant application of state statutes, including statutes of limitation,
contributed to the “organizational orientation” of the federal judiciary toward the states.531 Similarly, the federal courts’ application of
state law was necessary for their institutional legitimacy. The Rules
of Decision Act embodied an important antifederalist principle.532
The strength of that imperative is evident from the federal court
opinions coming out of Pennsylvania before 1809. Federal courts
generally interpreted the Rules of Decision Act as overriding the
federal distinction between law and equity. In 1806, for example,
Justice Washington demonstrated the federal judiciary’s institutional malleability by administering equity on the common law side
of the federal court, sitting, in effect, exactly like another court of
the state.533 But in 1811, after Bodley and Brown had spoken of
chancery courts exercising jurisdiction on their own principles,
Washington reversed course, refusing to apply the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s equitable liberalization of the common law action of
account.534
528

SKOWRONEK, supra note 28, at 23.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 110, at 435.
530
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)).
531
SKOWRONEK, supra note 28, at 27–29.
532
See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 52–53, 81–88 (1923).
533
Browne v. Browne, 4 F. Cas. 440, 440–41 (Washington, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 2,035).
534
Jordan v. Wilkins, 13 F. Cas. 1112, 1112 (Washington, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 7,526).
529
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V.

EQUITABLE REMEDIAL RIGHTS TODAY: THE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
In Guaranty Trust, Frankfurter reassured us that there was life
in the old equitable dog yet. Federal courts retained the authority to
“afford an equitable remedy for a substantive right recognized by a
State even though a State court cannot give it.”535 Frankfurter’s
vague and tepid commitment to the equitable remedial rights doctrine begged plenty of questions. It “is difficult to square with the
basic principle of limited federal judicial authority set out in the remainder of the opinion.”536 It “flatly contradicted the outcome determination principle”537 because it refused to acknowledge that a
“state-defined substantive right and the remedy given for its enforcement may be so closely related that to enforce a different right
would change the ‘outcome’ significantly.”538 It left unanswered
whether “the federal court [may] grant specific performance or an
injunction where only money damages are available in state
courts.”539 Indeed, Frankfurter’s “use of the remedial rights doctrine
seems more for rhetorical emphasis than as a reaffirmance of the
doctrine itself.”540 In the decade following Guaranty Trust, the opinion’s “proper interpretation . . . [wa]s little aided by subsequent decisions.”541 By 1958, a Harvard Law Review note was ambivalent
on whether the equitable remedial rights doctrine still had force.542
Today, the scope and application of the “equitable remedial
rights doctrine” remains mired in confusion. In 2010, a district court
in Maine observed that “[w]hether federal courts sitting in diversity
are bound by state limits on equitable remedies is a matter of some
dispute.”543 Nowhere is the confusion on more painful display than
when litigants seek preliminary injunctions in diversity actions. This

535

Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 106 (1945).
Cross, supra note 2, at 174.
537
Crump, supra note 2, at 1240.
538
Past and Present, supra note 14, at 842.
539
Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine, supra note 14, at 415–16.
540
Past and Present, supra note 14, at 841.
541
Id.
542
Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal Remedies, 71 HARV. L. REV.
513, 518–19 (1958).
543
In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 751 F. Supp. 2d 183,
191 n.9 (D. Me. 2010).
536
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Part outlines the confusion about preliminary injunctions and, drawing on the facilitative conception of federal equity, proposes a system of shifting presumptions to ameliorate it.
A.
The Malady
Federal courts today are still grappling with the internal incoherence of Guaranty Trust. On the one hand, Frankfurter attempted to
destroy the federal diversity court’s decisional independence by
placing it as “in effect, only another court of the State.”544 On the
other hand, he seemingly preserved the federal diversity court’s decisional independence by saying that it can “afford an equitable remedy for a substantive right recognized by a State even though a State
court cannot give it.”545 There may be a direct line from this overt
contradiction to the federal courts’ confusion over preliminary injunctions.546
Federal courts have split for decades on whether state or federal
law should govern the availability of preliminary injunctions in diversity actions.547 To some, it is natural that federal law should govern. The interlocutory injunction merely prevents irreparable injury
before a decision on the merits, and therefore cannot be outcome
determinative. Many federal courts have adopted this line of

544

Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
Id. at 106.
546
See Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F.
Supp. 923, 931 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (“To some degree, this conflict among the
courts may be the result of two potentially inconsistent statements in Guaranty
Trust.”).
547
See, e.g., Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir.
1988) (“We recognize that federal courts analyzing the availability of preliminary
injunctions in similar cases have come to contradictory conclusions.”); Kaiser
Trading Co., 321 F. Supp. at 931 n.14 (“The courts are in conflict . . . as to whether
state or federal law governs the issuance of an injunction.”); Am. Gen. Corp. v.
NLT Corp., No. H-82-1434, 1982 WL 1332, at *17 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 1982) (noting that “there is a split among the jurisdictions as to whether federal or state law
governs the issuance of a preliminary injunction in a diversity action”); U.S. Cable
Television Grp., L.P. v. City of Osage City, No. 91–4195–R, 1991 WL 201232,
at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 5, 1991) (“The authorities are split on this issue.”); Fed. Leasing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 487 F. Supp. 1248, 1260 (D. Md. 1980) (noting that “the authorities are split concerning whether federal law or state law governs the issuance of a preliminary injunction in a diversity action”).
545

256

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:176

thought,548 including the Second Circuit.549 And this approach has
pedigree: after all, the Supreme Court in Brailsford, acting on general equitable principles, enjoined the execution of a circuit court
548
See, e.g., Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800, 806
(2d Cir. 1981) (“State law does not govern the scope of the equity powers of the
federal court; and this is so even when state law supplies the rule of decision.”);
Capital Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d 171, 172–73 (4th
Cir. 1988) (stating that federal law applies to preliminary injunctions in diversity
cases); Ferrero v. Associated Materials Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1991)
(applying federal procedure to determine whether the preliminary injunction was
properly issued); Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine, No. 2:15–
cv–328–FtM–29MRM, 2017 WL 3188502, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 25, 2017) (“Federal law governs the issuance, and dissolution, of a preliminary injunction in a
diversity action. It is state law, however, that determines whether injunctive relief
is available for the given state cause of action or remedy.”) (citations omitted);
Tri-Dam v. Yick, No. 1:11-CV-01301 AWI-SMS, 2016 WL 4061348, at *5 (E.D.
Cal. July 28, 2016) (stating that federal law applies “in the preliminary injunction
context”); Clark Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir.
1970) (“Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Erie doctrine deprive
Federal courts in diversity cases of the power to enforce State-created substantive
rights by well-recognized equitable remedies even though such remedy might not
be available in the courts of the State.”); Crossno v. Crossno, No. 87–762, 1987
WL 13080, at *1 (E.D. La. June 18, 1987) (“[P]laintiff is entitled to the equitable
remedy of [temporary] injunction even though that remedy might not be available
to a state court litigant.”); Anselmo v. Mull, No. CIV. 2:12–1422 WBS EFB, 2012
WL 5304799, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2012) (“Courts have held . . . that federal,
not state, standards govern issuance of a preliminary injunction when a federal
court is sitting in diversity or exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims.”); Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947, 957 (E.D.
Cal. 1990) (“[F]ederal law provides the standards governing plaintiff’s motion for
preliminary injunctive relief with respect to . . . her . . . state law claims.”); Irving
Tr. Co. v. Braswell, 596 F. Supp. 1441, 1443–44 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); U.S. Cable,
1991 WL 201232, at *2 (“[T]he Tenth Circuit has expressly indicated that federal
law standards apply in determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue.”) (citing Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1361 (10th Cir. 1990));
Fed. Leasing, 487 F. Supp. at 1260 (stating that federal law governs the issuance
of a preliminary injunction in a diversity action), aff’d, 650 F.2d 495 (4th Cir.
1981); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Am. Wholesale Co., 235 F.2d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 1956);
Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 357 n.10 (3d Cir. 1980)
(quoting Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Sci. Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1141 (3d
Cir. 1977)); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 470 F.
Supp. 1308, 1312 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
549
See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. Conn. Packing Co., 732 F.2d 286,
288 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that a district court sitting in diversity is not permitted “to ignore the federal law requirement that threatened irreparable injury
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judgment pending determination of Georgia’s common law
claim.550 But many other federal courts have held precisely the opposite: state law should govern the availability of preliminary injunctions in diversity litigation.551 Faced with the split, the D.C. Circuit said that “it is not clear whether the court should look solely to
the law of . . . the forum for this diversity suit, or whether it is able
to draw on the independent equity power inherent in the federal
courts.”552
If only it were that simple. There are a couple of complicating
factors. First, federal preliminary injunction requirements can incorporate state law. So, for example, federal law requires that the movant show “a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation,” but the notion of “eventual success” can only be determined

must be shown before a preliminary injunction may issue”); Am. Brands, Inc. v.
Playgirl, Inc., 498 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1974).
550
See Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunction Standards in Massachusetts
State and Federal Courts, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (2013) (classifying
Brailsford as involving a preliminary injunction).
551
See, e.g., Sims, 863 F.2d at 646; Agnew v. Alicanto, S.A., 125 F.R.D. 355,
359 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (explaining that New York law governs availability of a
temporary restraining order in a diversity action.); Am. Gen. Corp., 1982 WL
1332, at *17 (“[T]he state law governing the right to [preliminary] injunctive relief
must be applied in diversity cases . . . .”); Hudson Nat’l Bank v. Shapiro, 695 F.
Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (“This diversity action requires this Court to apply Florida law in establishing whether or not the movant has established [entitlement to a preliminary injunction.]”); Borman’s, Inc. v. Great Scott Super Mkts.,
Inc., 433 F. Supp. 343, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (“[In a preliminary injunction request,] it would appear entirely proper for the Court to look to state law to determine when and whether a showing of irreparable harm must be made.”); First 100,
LLC v. Omni Fin., LLC, No. 2:16-cv-00099-RFB-CWH, 2016 WL 2980673, at
*7 (D. Nev. May 23, 2016) (“Where (as here) the Court’s jurisdiction is based on
diversity of citizenship, the Court must apply state law regarding the availability
of preliminary injunctive relief rather than federal law if the state law is outcomedeterminative.”); Anglo-Am. Inv. Trust Ltd. v. Pearson, 294 F. Supp. 1150, 1153
(E.D. Wis. 1969).
552
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816,
828 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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by reference to state law.553 Thus, federal preliminary injunction requirements have “both federal and state aspects.”554 Second, sometimes “the outcome is in large part determined at the preliminary
injunction stage.”555 A preliminary injunction can be “so bound up
with the substantive rights of the party that an independent federal
equitable remedy would interfere with the goals of Erie.”556 A district court in 1970 argued that “the best approach would be to look
to state law to determine if a preliminary injunction is permissible,”
and then “look to federal law to determine whether the court should
exercise its discretion.”557
It gets worse. Most courts are careful to distinguish between preliminary and permanent injunctions for the obvious reason that a
permanent injunction is the conclusive determination of the
claim.558 At least one district court, however, has erroneously transposed the above mess concerning preliminary injunctions to the per-

553

Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Sci. Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1141 (3d
Cir. 1977). In the Sixth Circuit, “[w]hile [federal courts] apply [their] own procedural jurisprudence regarding the factors to consider in granting a preliminary injunction, [they] apply [State] law to determine whether Plaintiff has met the first
of these factors by demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits
of his underlying diversity action.” Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network,
L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir. 2007). The Eighth Circuit uses
a four-factor federal balancing standard, but looks to state law for each factor. See
Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 935–36 (8th Cir. 2002). See
also Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947, 956 (E.D. Cal.
1990) (“The above analysis is not meant to suggest that state law may not inform
the court’s exercise of its equitable powers in determining whether preliminary
injunctive relief is available in a particular case.”).
554
Sys. Operations, Inc., 555 F.2d at 1141.
555
Sims, 869 F.2d at 647.
556
Friends, 746 F.2d at 828 n.18.
557
Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp.
923, 931 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Accord Anselmo v. Mull, No. CIV. 2:12–1422
WBS EFB, 2012 WL 5304799, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2012) (“In applying the
federal injunction standard, courts recognize that state law would control on the
issue of whether a plaintiff is entitled to seek injunctive relief on the claim. After
concluding that a plaintiff is entitled to seek a preliminary injunction, however,
courts often rely on the federal standard in exercising their discretion to determine
whether to grant an injunction.”) (citations omitted).
558
See, e.g., Capital Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d
171, 172 (4th Cir. 1988); Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. at 956; Tri-Dam v. Yick, No.
1:11-CV-01301 AWI-SMS, 2016 WL 4061348, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2016).
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manent injunction context, concluding that “even if a permanent injunction is permissible under state law, this Court may still exercise
its discretion to deny the permanent injunction.”559 This is a startling, pre-Erie assertion of independent federal authority to refuse
final relief that state law would give.
B.
The Tonic
The existence of facilitative federal equity demonstrates that heterogeneity was not a necessary consequence of Erie. Heterogeneous
and facilitative federal equity are both oriented toward the states.
Heterogeneity enacted a strong turn to the states by situating the federal diversity courts as state courts. The orientation of facilitative
federal equity to the states may be less pronounced, but it was effective in maintaining the role and status of the states in the early years
of the Republic, while retaining some decisional independence in
the federal courts.
Facilitative federal equity provides a key for resolving the contradiction in Guaranty Trust because it plausibly walked a fine line
between maintaining a modicum of federal decisional independence, and being state-regarding. And it walked this fine line by capitalizing on equity’s classic distinction between the exclusive jurisdiction (trust enforcement is the usual example) and the jurisdiction
in aid of legal rights (quia timet injunctions, bills of discovery, bills
of interpleader, and so on). Facilitative federal equity was state-regarding especially when acting in aid of legal rights: Brailsford was
a preliminary injunction, Maxfield a bill of discovery.
If preliminary or auxiliary equitable relief in aid of a legal right
was granted, courts of equity often had to decide whether to take
jurisdiction over the whole cause of action or to relinquish substantive jurisdiction to the common law. Riding circuit in 1831, Justice
Baldwin put the problem as follows:
When the jurisdiction of equity attaches, the extent
of its exercise depends on the nature and object of the
suit, if required only as preliminary, or auxiliary to a
legal remedy, its power ceases when that is effected
by the aid of equity; a subpoena in equity does not
559
United Nat’l Maint., Inc. v. San Diego Convention Ctr. Corp., No.
07cv2172 AJB, 2012 WL 3861946, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2012).

260

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:176

. . . draw from law, the cognizance of legal rights or
legal remedies, when an auxiliary relief alone was
called for, . . . or be abused as a pretext for bringing
causes proper for a court of law into equity.560
If a bill of discovery, for example, “involves the essence and
merits of the whole case,” then a court of equity would make a final
decree.561 Similarly, if a contract was made by fraud, and the common law provided no relief, then the court of equity, “having thus
possession of the principal question, makes a final decree on the
question and equity of the whole case.”562 The “plain and intelligible” rule, said Baldwin, is that if a court of equity takes cognizance
of “the cause itself,” then it “would not send the party back to law
to settle [the] incidents.”563 Conversely, “if the incidents only are
before [the equity court],” then it would not “take the substance of
the controversy from [common] law.”564
This provides a useful analogy and guide for a steadier application of the equitable remedial rights doctrine. Given the constraints
of Erie and Guaranty Trust, the doctrine must be limited. Plainly,
the requested equitable relief cannot involve “the essence and merits
of the whole case”; otherwise, the doctrine would swallow Erie
whenever equitable relief is requested.565 To appropriate Baldwin,
then, the equitable remedial rights doctrine depends on the nature
and object of the relief requested. It can extend no further than relief
that facilitates, or is preliminary or auxiliary to, the state-created
right.566 As with equitable doctrine generally, this is a case-by-case
inquiry. But it is possible to posit a system of rebuttable presumptions that implement the broad principles.
The default position is commanded by Guaranty Trust: state law
governs when equitable relief is requested in a federal court enforcing a state right.567 That default presumption can be rebutted only in
560
Baker v. Biddle, 2 F. Cas. 439, 446 (Baldwin, Circuit Justice, C.C.E.D. Pa.
1831) (No. 764).
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limited circumstances: federal standards apply if the requested equitable relief is preliminary or auxiliary to, or merely facilitates the
determination of, the state-created right.568 This category of equitable relief is ascertainable and limited.569 It excludes remedies like
specific performance and defenses like laches, because those touch
the essence and merits of the state cause of action.570 It includes discovery and other judicial housekeeping matters.571 Generally speaking, it also includes the preliminary injunction, which merely preserves the parties’ relative positions pending a merits decision.572
Accordingly, if the equitable relief requested is merely preliminary,
auxiliary, or facilitative, then the presumption arises that federal
standards govern. That presumption, in turn, can be rebutted if the
requested equitable relief, although ordinarily preliminary, auxiliary, or facilitative, is in all the circumstances functionally equivalent to final relief.
There is limited force to the obvious counterargument that this
system of shifting presumptions simply transfers the problem. The
objection says that rather than debate the scope of the equitable remedial rights doctrine, courts will simply debate the vagueness of
facilitative relief and functional equivalence of final relief. The first
response is that the system of shifting presumptions neither can nor
should operate as an algorithm to eradicate vagueness. But more importantly, the set of shifting presumptions ameliorates the vagueness
problem by structuring the analysis. It implements the proper narrow
scope of the equitable remedial rights doctrine. Cases have given
content to the equitable jurisdiction in aid of legal rights; the category of preliminary, auxiliary or facilitative relief is relatively determinate.
Nor do genuine preliminary injunctions implicate the twin aims
of Erie. This is not to deny that different law governing the availability of preliminary injunctions in state and federal court may generate reasons to forum shop. Perhaps genuine preliminary injunctions which do not effect final relief may form the basis of settlement, and plaintiffs will choose the venue where they are more
568
569
570
571
572

See Baker, 2 F. Cas. at 446–47.
See id. at 443–44.
See id. at 452.
Past and Present, supra note 14, at 843–45.
Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
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likely to obtain that leverage. (This is a plausible empirical hypothesis.) In the eyes of Erie, however, some forum shopping is more
equal than others. A plethora of practitioner literature advises
whether to bring suit in state or federal court; many of these forumshopping strategies are beyond Erie’s gaze.573 Erie requires the application of the state law of negligence (including contributory negligence),574 conflict of laws,575 state statutes of limitation and rules
about tolling,576 the enforceability of contractual arbitration
clauses,577 state damages caps,578 and the standard of review of jury
verdicts.579 In other words, Erie requires the application of state law
that speaks to the existence, nature, or size of ultimate liability as
deliberated on, and determined by, the federal diversity court. A
genuine preliminary injunction—issued provisionally on partial or
scant information and possibly unsatisfactory evidence—does not
speak to the ultimate issue. Its use by parties as a bargaining chip to
extract a favorable outcome during settlement negotiations should
not affect the substantive judicial determination of the state-created
right. A federal diversity court’s ultimate merits decision should not
be responsive to a party’s settlement negotiation strategy.
An appealing counterargument runs as follows: remedies are
substantive; Erie requires federal diversity courts to apply state substantive law; therefore, Erie requires federal diversity courts to always apply state law when deciding whether to give any relief.580
This would be a perfectly valid syllogism if “substantive” had a
fixed meaning. But as Frankfurter observed in Guaranty Trust, the
meaning of “substance” depends on “the particular problem for
which it is used.”581 To be sure, remedies are substantive because
573
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they give practical content to primary rights and duties.582 But that
is the start, not the end, of the Erie inquiry. So, for example, the law
governing permanent injunctions, specific performance, and the
measure of damages is substantive for Erie purposes. But it does not
necessarily follow from the existence of state substantive law of preliminary injunctions that Erie requires federal diversity courts to apply that law. As I have argued, some genuine preliminary injunctions are not outcome-determinative in light of Erie’s twin aims.
That does not deny that preliminary injunctions are remedially substantive; it only denies that all preliminary injunctions are substantive for Erie purposes.
Genuine preliminary injunctions are, for Erie purposes, analogous to a federal diversity court’s inherent power to sanction badfaith conduct free of the constraints of state law. In Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., Justice White for the Court held that the assessment
of attorney’s fees as a sanction for bad-faith conduct did not implicate Erie’s twin aims.583 The imposition of sanctions “depends not
on which party wins the lawsuit, but on how the parties conduct
themselves during the litigation.”584 And “Erie guarantees a litigant
that if he takes his state law cause of action to federal court . . . the
result in his case will be the same as if he had brought it in state
court,” but “[i]t does not allow him to waste the court’s time and
resources with cantankerous conduct, even in the unlikely event a
state court would allow him to do so.”585 Sanctions for conduct during litigation did not implicate substantive state policy, but “vindicat[ed] judicial authority.”586 Likewise, genuine preliminary injunctions serve an important function for the vindication of judicial authority. They preserve the subject matter of the dispute to prevent
the judicial process becoming nugatory. Indeed, “the most compelling reason in favor of entering a Rule 65(a) order is the need to
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prevent the judicial process from being rendered futile by defendant’s action or refusal to act.”587 A “preliminary injunction is appropriate whenever the policy of preserving the court’s power to decide
the case effectively outweighs the risk of imposing an interim restraint before it has done so.”588 In other words, a federal court is
entitled to apply federal law to protect the integrity of the federal
judicial process.589
An example will assist. In Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, the
Ninth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction that had enjoined
snowboarding icon Craig Kelly from using or endorsing any snowboard other than a Sims, and from using or endorsing any accessory
products identified as Burton products.590 The district court’s injunction was based on an anticipated breach of a personal service
contract, even though a California statute prohibited state courts
from issuing such injunctions.591 The Ninth Circuit focused on California’s statutory policy, and held that “[t]he general equitable powers of federal courts should not enable a party suing in diversity to
obtain an injunction if state law clearly rejects the availability of that
remedy.”592 The Court observed that “the outcome is in large part
determined at the preliminary injunction stage,” because “[i]f Kelly
is enjoined from competing for Burton, Sims has accomplished what
California has prohibited—the enforcement of a personal service
contract.”593
The Sims opinion gestured in the right direction. But it conflated
two separate issues: whether a preliminary injunction would effect
final relief, and whether a preliminary injunction would contravene
California’s statutory policy. The opinion suggested that the preliminary injunction is outcome-determinative because a state court
could not give it.594 That cannot be true generally: purely procedural
equitable remedies (for example, discovery) are not outcome-determinative in federal court just because state courts cannot give them.
587
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The real question is whether, in all the circumstances of the case, an
ordinarily facilitative equitable remedy would in fact effect final relief. And this is the question that is ultimately posed by the system
of shifting presumptions. First, although state law usually governs
equitable relief when state rights are enforced in federal court, a preliminary injunction is designed merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties pending a merits determination. Under the equitable remedial rights doctrine, federal law governs temporary injunctions that prevent irreparable injury pending a decision on the
merits. But second, in Sims it is contestable whether the district
court’s preliminary injunction in fact effected final relief. This cannot be answered by observing that a state court would have no authority to issue such facilitative relief. It can only be answered, in
classic equitable fashion, by considering all the circumstances of the
case.595
CONCLUSION: OUR EQUITY
This Article has attempted to capture the distinctive course of
American equity. On one level, it describes the unique strain of
American equity produced by vesting chancery jurisdiction in a new
federal judiciary. It is really a tale of three equities. The first, homogeneous equity, once exhausted federal equity, but today it operates
when enforcing federal rights or applying the equitable remedial
rights doctrine. This equity is strong and expansive, claiming direct
lineage to the English High Court of Chancery of the eighteenth century. Nowhere is the power of this equity clearer than in public law.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the federal courts brought to
bear the full power of equity in a federalism where the central gov-
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ernment is supreme in the valid exercise of its constitutional authority.596 Indeed, this equity got so strong that abstention doctrines were
trotted out to limit its power (which, incidentally, parallels the English High Court of Chancery’s cautious use of the common injunction after vanquishing the common law).597 Justice Black called abstention an example of “Our Federalism,” because it is sensitive to
the legitimate interests and activities of the states.598
The second and third conceptions of equity—what we might collectively term Our Equity—are characterized by an important pivot
towards state law. Until now, this equity was thought to have been
exhausted by a muscular heterogeneity. Guaranty Trust did not require that federal equity courts enforcing state-created rights be only
sensitive to the legitimate interests and activities of the state; it required that they adopt those legitimate interests and activities for
themselves. Perhaps Guaranty Trust represents blind deference to
the states against which Black cautioned. This Article suggests that
Guaranty Trust introduced a deep tension into the work of federal
equity courts enforcing state-created rights. But this Article also
shows that Our Equity need not eliminate as far as constitutionally
possible the separate identity of the federal equity courts. Indeed,
there was another conception of federal equity, which I called the
facilitative conception and which, just like Our Federalism, was
born in the early struggling days of our Union. It, too, was sensitive
to the legitimate interests and activities of the state, and did not unduly interfere with them.
On a second level, this Article is about legal doctrine. It attempts
to provide real guidance to federal courts. If a preliminary injunction
596
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is an extraordinary remedy, then we should get the governing law
straight. The conditions of the exercise of a federal diversity court’s
extraordinary remedial power should be well understood. This is not
just a preliminary injunction problem, but an equitable remedial
rights problem. There is, for example, a split on whether state or
federal law applies to an award of attorney fees. Even though the
Supreme Court suggested in 1975 that state law should govern,599
the First Circuit has since said otherwise, at least for federal class
actions.600 Moreover, this Article is about the role that legal doctrine
plays to serve political ends or maintain delicate political balances.
Collins persuasively showed the extent to which Frankfurter was
motivated by his progressivism.601 Facilitative federal equity was
animated by a desire to ease, so far as it could, the suspicion with
which the states viewed the early federal government. In fact, before
1809, Our Equity played a part in the construction of the United
States.
On a third level, this Article raises questions about the nature
and history of equity. For example, scholarship discussing individual American colonies can have a “best in show” quality. One
scholar says that Maryland was different to other colonies because
it recognized equity at an early date;602 another that equity in South
Carolina was especially and impressively advanced;603 and another
that “[t]here can be no doubt that Virginia courts exercised a more
advanced form of Equity jurisdiction than did the courts in other
colonies,” including South Carolina.604 A systematic evaluation of
colonial equity would be fruitful.
This Article also raises persistent questions about the desirability of equity’s preservation in the United States. In Federalist 83,
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Hamilton saw great advantages to the separation of law and equity.605 Iredell agreed.606 A minority of contemporary American
scholars defend the law/equity distinction,607 or at least lament its
dissolution.608 But the dominant view is for fusion.609 Today the distinction between law and equity is so antiquated that a prominent
text on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can assert that “the only
respect in which the ancient distinctions between law and equity
have continued to be significant since the merger of the two federal
civil justice systems in 1938 is with regard to the scope of the jury
trial right.”610 Douglas Laycock famously argued that “[e]quity is
ordinary, not extraordinary, in remedies, procedure, and substance,”
and “[t]he distinctive traditions of equity now pervade the legal system.”611 This raises important questions. Should the equitable remedial rights doctrine be preserved at all? Is equity really an enforceable body of intelligible doctrine? Or is it no more than a space for
normative discourse, and, if so, is it desirable to preserve that normative vocabulary?
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